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1. Introduction   
1.1. Extreme Poverty: Background of the Research Problem and Research Questions  
 
During the last three decades, the number of people living in extreme poverty worldwide, 
considering the headcount ratio at $1.90 a day, has decreased from 35.9% to 10%. While there 
has been undeniable progress, the number of people living in extreme poverty is still alarming. 
In 2015, 735 million people were living below the extreme poverty line, unable to meet their 
basic needs to survive.1 As a consequence, extremely poor people experience chronic 
undernutrition, famine, illiteracy and death from poverty-related and preventable diseases.2  
 
Extreme poverty is a multidimensional and complex issue caused by social, economic, cultural 
and political processes. This thesis embraces the concept of capability poverty, which considers 
both income and social well-being when defining the phenomenon. Freedom from extreme 
poverty is one of the most important human interests.3 Since the beginning of the 1990’s, 
extreme poverty has been understood as a human rights issue by international organizations, 
including the United Nations (UN) system. During the last years, the UN system and other 
international agencies have been legitimating and increasing the recognition of the negative 
impact of extreme poverty on the ability of people to enjoy their basic freedoms and human 
rights.4 
 
It is well established that extreme poverty and human rights are part of the same struggle and 
that improving human rights has a direct effect on diminishing extreme poverty.5 Regardless 
of the advocacy of international agencies for the understanding of extreme poverty as a human 
rights violation, extreme poverty itself is not established as a violation of human rights by any 
binding instrument.6 Even in resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA), extreme poverty is recognized as a violation of human dignity, an obstacle to the 
                                               
1 See World Bank, 2019(a) available at http://povertydata.worldbank.org/Poverty/Home. 
2 Pogge, 2007, p. 11-13. 
3 Ibid. p. 11. 
4 Economic and Social Council, Human Rights and Extreme Poverty: Report of the Independent Expert Arjun 
Sengupta, March 2006. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/43, para. 2. 
5 Formisano Prada, 2011, p. 17. 
6 E.g. Economic and Social Council, Human Rights and Extreme Poverty: Report of the Independent Expert Arjun 
Sengupta, March 2006.. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/43. 
Catherine Silvério Guisso 
2 
 
fulfilment of all human rights but not as a human rights violation as such.7 As consequence, 
extremely poor people are not entitled to claim in national courts, judicial bodies or 
international courts that their human rights are violated, solely on the basis of their poverty. 
   
However, the absence of recognition of extreme poverty as a violation of human rights does 
not mean that the extremely poor have no protection under the human rights framework. 
Therefore, the research questions of this thesis are: 
(i) In which ways can the international human rights framework be a resourceful tool 
for mitigating extreme poverty?  
(ii) Which human rights can be invoked for protecting the extremely poor?  
(iii) What are the obligations of states towards the extremely poor?  
(iv) How has extreme poverty been addressed by national and international courts when 
finding violations of human rights? 
 
It is important to clarify that the primary responsibility to guarantee the implementation of the 
rights which have a constitutive relevance to extreme poverty, and all human rights, belongs to 
national actors. As clarified by the former High Commissioner of Human Rights: “it is through 
action at the national level that international human rights obligations can be translated into 
reality”.8 The implementation of human rights occurs on a national level. Many states have 
human rights prescribed in their domestic legislation.  
 
When a state ratifies regional and international human rights instruments, they are required to 
ensure that the individuals in their jurisdiction can benefit from the guarantees prescribed by 
these instruments.9 International treaties can be directly applicable at national level as well. In 
many cases, constitutional law provides the applicability of international treaties.10 In some 
countries all the international treaties are part of the domestic legislation automatically. In other 
states, international treaties are incorporated in domestic systems and, in a third group of 
countries, they are implemented through domestic legislation that makes human rights 
applicable without giving them the status of domestic law. National courts often rely on 
                                               
7 The latest:  General Assembly, Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, 15 January 2019. UN doc. A/RES/73/163. 
But also UN Doc. A/RES/57/211, UN Doc. A/RES/53/146, UN Doc. A/RES/47/196, UN Doc. A/RES/46/121. 
8 General Assembly, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. Report of 
the Secretary-General, Annex, Plan of Action, May 2005. UN doc. A/59/2005/Add.3, para. 22 
9 Boerefijn, 2012, p. 631. 
10 Scheinin, 2012, p. 19-37. 
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international instruments as a source of inspiration or as an interpretive guide to apply domestic 
legislation.11 Furthermore, international systems have supervisory monitoring functions which 
have the capacity to contribute towards the implementation and evolution of international 
human rights law.12 
1.2. Methodology  
 
In order to answer the research questions, relevant international documents are analysed and 
systematised using the legal dogmatic method. There are three sources of international law 
defined by article 38 of Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). These are: (i) 
international conventions which establish rules that are expressly recognized by the State 
parties, (ii) international customary law, as evidence of general practice accepted as law, and 
(iii) the general principles of international law recognized by civilized nations. Moreover, the 
article prescribes other sources which are considered subsidiary: judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.13 
 
As previously argued, hard law instruments do not prescribe extreme poverty as a human rights 
violation. However, hard law instruments prescribe the rights which have a constitutive 
relevance to poverty, as will be analysed in the following chapter. Those considered in this 
thesis are: The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).  
 
In order to establish a straightforward connection to extreme poverty, hard law provisions are 
complemented by soft law instruments. Soft law documents have different legal implications 
than hard law provisions. However, human rights treaties tend to be textually abstract, Scheinin 
argues that “only through substantive knowledge of the case law, concluding observations, 
general comments or other interpretive material emanating from the international monitoring 
body, will national actors be able to understand what a human rights treaty really is about”.14 
                                               
11 Scheinin, 2012, p.  657. 
12 Ibid. 
13 ICJ, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1946, Article 38. 
14 Scheinin, 2012, p. 676. 
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These above mentioned soft instruments are used to detail and clarify the provisions prescribed 
in hard law instruments.  
 
There are different monitoring functions in international systems. Two of them will be 
discussed in the following chapters :(i) the function to clarify the content and obligations of 
states towards human rights and (ii) the function to offer subsidiary protection through 
complaints procedures which consider individual communication.15 Documents originated 
from the first function will be used to clarify the scope, nature and content of states obligations 
towards the extreme poor. Those documents are: the General Comments issued by the Human 
Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.16 To Scheinin, 
general comments are a form of institutionalized practise of interpretation. They are based in 
reporting procedures, case law, other sources of international law and academic writing.17 In 
the same way, Riedel clarifies that general comments aim to elucidate the understanding of the 
rights and obligations anchored in the covenants, orientating actions and policies for all actors 
involved in the promotion and fulfilment of human rights. Although general comments are not 
legally binding, Riedel argues that states generally apply the criteria developed in the comments 
and whenever a dialogue is settled with states, it usually follows the criteria prescribed in the 
general comments. They are legal standards that meet with little opposition from states.18 The 
case law originated from this second function will be used to support the claim that human 
rights litigation, also in international level, can be an important tool to empower and protect 
the poor. The cases of the UN system will not be considered, but the jurisprudence of the 
African and the Inter-American systems because of the concentration of extreme poverty in 
both regions. 
 
There are also other relevant UN documents for discussing extreme poverty and human rights, 
such as the Special Rapporteur’s reports on extreme poverty and human rights, which are 
included in this thesis. Additionally, reports from other international agencies are considered, 
such as UNESCO and UNICEF, as well as other academic publications in the human rights 
field.  
 
                                               
15 Other international monitoring functions include reporting systems and inquiry procedures. 
16 Von Schorlemer, 2011, p. 477. 
17 Scheinin, 2012, p. 666-667. 
18 Riedel, p.145-146. 
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1.3. Limitations 
 
In order to maintain the focus on the research questions it is necessary to restrict the scope of 
this thesis. Firstly, it is important to acknowledge that once poverty is a multidimensional and 
complex issue it cannot be expected that the human rights field would offer all the answers to 
tackle the issue. Legal rules can affect the distribution of income, assets and power and they 
can contribute for the creation or perpetuation of imbalances between and within states. 
Therefore, only within the legal field there are many other areas that could be addressed in the 
attempt to tackle extreme poverty, such as trade, labour, contract, tort, taxation, intellectual 
property and immigration.19 These fields are important in addressing the causes of poverty and 
inequality, however, they are out of the scope of this thesis. There are many other areas outside 
the legal field that have relevant tools for tackling this complex issue, such as public policies 
related to cash transfer and redistribution of income. However, this thesis is limited exclusively 
on the tools that the human rights field can offer to mitigate extreme poverty. 
 
Moreover, it is important to clarify that this thesis focuses only on extreme poverty. Poverty is 
a wider phenomenon. The current poverty line is established at the headcount ratio of $5.00 
per day. In 2013, more than 3 billion people suffered from poverty.20 This thesis analyses only 
the poorest of the poor. Most of the connections between poverty and human rights can be 
established considering poverty as a wider phenomenon, for example, when establishing which 
human rights are considered to have a constitutive relevance to poverty. However, the 
limitation to extreme poverty is important when considering the rise of state obligations to 
tackle the issue. It is argued that only extreme poverty invokes an immediate obligation on 
states, once the survival of people is threatened.  
 
Furthermore, extreme poverty as a social phenomenon is an issue that only affects developing 
states. 21 Although it is recognized that poverty can be determined by domestic and international 
factors, this thesis focuses on developing states and their obligations towards their population. 
Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the international cooperation for development is an 
obligation for all states, especially of those which are able to assist others.22 
                                               
19 Williams, 2006, p. 1. 
20 UNICEF, 2016, p. 75. 
21 Sachs, 2005, p. 20. 
22 As established in the Declaration on the Right to Development (UN General Assembly, Declaration on the 
Right to Development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 4 December 1986, UN Doc A/RES/41/128). 
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1.4. Structure 
 
In order to answer the research questions, Chapter 2 establishes the connection between poverty 
and human rights. Poverty is defined by embracing the Amartya Sen’s conception of capability 
poverty and basic freedoms. After that, it is shown how the human rights agenda and the 
poverty agenda are connected. Also, it is argued that although a wide range of human rights 
can be considered when addressing poverty, there are only a few human rights which are part 
of the definition of poverty or, in other words, which have a constitutive relevance to poverty. 
In order to define those rights, a correspondent human right to each basic freedom is 
established. Those are (i) the right to life, (ii) the right to adequate standards of living, including 
adequate food, housing and water23, (iii) the right to health and (iv), the right to education. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the international framework for the protection of extremely poor people and 
the nature and scope of the state’s obligations towards those rights. This chapter is divided in 
two sections. The first presents the hard law instruments that prescribes the rights which have 
a constitutive relevance to poverty. The second section presents the nature and scope of those 
rights, analysing the obligations of states through soft law documents. In this section the 
minimum core obligations of states are introduced. Minimum core obligations are set to ensure 
that a minimum essential level of each right is realized in every state. Those are related to 
essential food, primary health care, basic shelter, housing and the most basic form of 
education.24 The obligation to fulfil the minimum core is immediate and not passive to the 
progressive realization of rights. Therefore, it is argued that extreme poverty as a phenomenon 
can be considered a violation of the state toward its population.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the content of the human rights in connection to poverty. In other words, 
the aim of this section is not to present an exhaustive analysis of the content of each of the 
rights, but rather, to concentrate on the matters which are mostly relevant to the poverty 
discussion. In this sense, the minimum core content of each of the rights is central. Moreover, 
it is demonstrated how national and international courts have addressed claims made by 
                                               
International cooperation is also encouraged in the article 2 of the ICESCR (1966), related to states’ obligations 
and article 11 related to adequate standards of living. 
23 The right to water was later understood as a part of the right to adequate standards of living in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Those features will be further explained in the Chapter 4. 
24 CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations, 14 December 1990. UN. Doc. 
E/1991/23, para. 9-10. 
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extremely poor people and how courts have considered poverty as a key factor when finding 
violations of human rights. The last section of Chapter 4 concludes the previous sections 
arguing that judicial protection is an important tool in mitigating poverty. Also, the judicial 
obstacles that poor people face when seeking judicial remedies are presented.  
 
Extreme poor people are considered a vulnerable group. Vulnerable groups are composed by 
people that, because of certain social factors, find themselves or may find themselves affected 
by harm in a disproportional way when comparing to others in the society. To Nifosi-Sutton, 
the idea of vulnerability in international human rights law shall take in account: (i) the extent 
of the lack of legal protection and deprivation of rights which affects certain groups, (ii) 
whether the denial of those rights derives from discrimination based on prohibited grounds, 
(iii) the role that the states must play in order to deal with the protection of those groups and 
(iv) the empowerment of this groups in terms of participation and their access to justice and to 
seek redress when their rights have been violated.25 As demonstrated in this introduction, this 
thesis discusses the main points proposed by Nifosi-Sutton, showing how deprivation of human 
rights affects disproportionally the extreme poor, what are the states obligation towards them 
and discuss how the international human rights law and access to justice can be a resourceful 
tool for mitigating extreme poverty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
25 Nifosi-Sutton, 2017, p. 276-277. 
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2. Poverty and human rights - Establishing Connections 
2.1. Defining Poverty 
 
The conceptual debate on poverty began in the nineteenth century with the perspective of 
subsistence. Since then, the way to understand, characterize and measure poverty has evolved 
towards a more complex perception of the issue. In the 1950’s, the perspective of basic needs 
was the first to consider private and public assets in the understanding of poverty. This 
perspective includes the possibility to afford food, shelter, clothes (as private assets) and also 
the access to water, sanitation, health care, education (as public assets).26 In this sense, the 
perspective of basic needs was the first to establish a governmental responsibility when 
considering poverty. Additionally, the relative deprivation approach made important 
considerations regarding the social context of different societies and how this affect the way to 
understand the phenomenon.27 
 
At the international level, different actors adopt different approaches, in accordance with their 
mandates. The World Bank, for example, recognizes poverty as a multidimensional 
phenomenon, but uses the income poverty line methodology in its research. Income poverty is 
related to the lack of income or purchasing power. In the income poverty approach, poverty is 
classified into three different types: extreme poverty (absolute or severe), moderate poverty 
and relative poverty.28 
 
Below the extreme poverty line, people are not able to afford a nutritionally adequate diet and 
other essential non-food requirements.29 In other words, they are unable to meet their basic 
needs to survive. Extremely poor people face hunger, lack of drinking water and sanitation. 
They are unable to access essential public services related to health care and education and they 
usually lack adequate shelter and basic articles of clothing and hygiene.30 
 
Currently, the extreme poverty line is established at $1.90 per day.31 This line is calculated 
considering national poverty lines from selected poor countries in the world. Their average is 
                                               
26 Codes, 2008, p. 12-13. 
27 Ibid. p.15. 
28 Doz Costa, 2008, p. 83. 
29 UNDP, 1996, p. 222. 
30 Sachs, 2005, p. 20. 
31 Unless otherwise noted, “$” refers to US dollars. 
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converted to a common currency. It also considers purchasing power parity exchange rates to 
adjust differences in cost of living among the countries.32 Using this headcount ratio, the World 
Bank found that in 2015, 735 million people lived in extreme poverty, which represents 10% 
of the world’s population.33 
 
Moderate poverty refers to a condition in which people’s basic needs are met, but just barely. 
Relative poverty is associated with a given proportion of the average national income where 
the relatively poor suffer from lack of access to cultural goods and to quality public services.34 
However, the basic needs of people who live in relative poverty are met. For this reason, 
relative poverty falls outside the discussion of this thesis. 
 
Although it can be argued that the income poverty approach is limited in terms of complexity, 
since poverty is not an objective and inflexible phenomenon capable of being measured by a 
universal line, the income poverty approach is useful for quantitative purposes.35 It allows the 
identification of the most vulnerable among the poor and permits a focused analysis, as 
proposed in this thesis. Furthermore, it can be a guide of priority for the establishment of 
governmental action and policies. 
 
A more complex understanding of poverty which considers not only income, but embraces the 
concept of well-being, has been widely recognized during the last three decades.36 The 
‘capability approach’ or ‘capability poverty’ is based on Amartya Sen’s idea of poverty as a 
‘capability deprivation’. Capability poverty is connected to the notion of ‘impoverished lives’ 
and the deprivation- of basic freedoms. These include, according to Vizard, the freedom to be 
nourished, the freedom to enjoy adequate living conditions, the freedom to lead normal spans 
of life and the freedom to read and write.37 
 
In this sense, poverty is not only related to income poverty, but also to systematic deprivations 
of services, goods and other resources necessary for one’s survival and development, including 
the deprivation of medical care, housing, sanitation and education services.38  It refers to the 
                                               
32 UNICEF, 2016, p. 72. 
33 World Bank, 2019a, available at http://povertydata.worldbank.org/Poverty/Home 
34 Sachs, 2005, p. 20. 
35 Pogge, 2007, p. 11. 
36 Doz Costa, 2008, p. 84. 
37 Vizard, 2006, p. 3. 
38 Ibid. 
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non-fulfilment of human rights in connection with constraint of economic resources.39 
Sengupta has also included the social inclusion dimension to the composition of extreme 
poverty. It is sustained that extremely poor people are socially excluded, they are marginalized, 
discriminated and outside social relations. Therefore, extreme poverty can be understood as a 
combination of income poverty, deprivation poverty and social exclusion.40 
 
To conclude poverty can be understood as a multidimensional and complex issue as result of 
social, economic, cultural and political processes. In this context, different forms of deprivation 
are cumulative and reinforce one another forming a vicious circle of poverty.41 Extreme poverty 
is deeply connected to the idea of human dignity, which is one of the most fundamental ideas 
in international human rights law, a basic and core principle in which human rights are 
derived.42 Extreme poverty affects the enjoyment of human rights and can be related to several 
states’ obligations, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters. 
2.2. Poverty and Human Rights 
 
Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 and until the 1990’s, the 
human rights movement and the development (or poverty reduction) movement proceeded on 
different conception paths. Their agendas were set on parallel intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations without overlapping or interacting with each other. The main 
reason pointed out for this distance was the strong influence of the cold war politics. Only after 
the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (1993), which reaffirmed the indivisibility, 
interdependence and interrelation of all human rights, did poverty start to be recognized as a 
human right issue.43  
 
The international concern with poverty as a human rights issue has been reflected in many of 
the UN General Assembly’s and the UN Human Rights Commission’s resolutions.44 Since 
                                               
39 OHCHR, 2004, p. 8. 
40 Economic and Social Council, Human Rights and Extreme Poverty: Report of the Independent Expert Arjun 
Sengupta, March 2006. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/43, para. 4. 
41 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, 28 June 1996. UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/13, para.7. 
42 Carozza, 2013, p.345 and 350. 
43 Doz Costa, 2008, p. 81. 
44 Vizard, 2006, p. 9. 
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1998, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) have even established 
the mandate of a Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights.45 
 
 In many resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), extreme 
poverty is recognized as a violation of human dignity, avoiding the recognition of the issue as 
violation of human rights. Those resolutions usually recognize extreme poverty as an obstacle 
to the fulfilment of all human rights.46 However, other international bodies and agencies have 
taken a more straightforward approach, considering extreme poverty as a denial or a violation 
of human rights. 
 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has firmly recognized that 
poverty shall be understood as a human rights denial. To the CESCR, poverty is a condition of 
chronic deprivation of resources, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of 
an adequate standards of living and other civil, cultural, political and social rights. It embraces 
the multidimensionality of poverty “which reflects the indivisible and interdependent nature of 
all human rights”47. UNESCO goes even further and establishes poverty as a violation of 
human rights and, therefore, “illegal” in accordance to international law.48 In the same way, 
Sengupta, an independent expert, recommended the Commission of Human Rights to adopt a 
resolution affirming that extreme poverty was to be considered a denial of basic human rights.49 
 
Mary Robinson, the former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, sustains 
that the most serious form of violation of human rights in the present society is extreme poverty. 
According to Robinson: 
 
 Extreme poverty to me is the greatest denial of the exercise of human rights. You don’t vote, you don’t 
participate in any political activity, your views aren’t listened to, you have no food, you have no shelter, 
your children are dying of preventable diseases - you don’t even have the right to clean water. It’s a 
denial of the dignity and worth of each individual which is what the universal declaration proclaims.50 
                                               
45 OHCHR, 2019. Available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/poverty/pages/srextremepovertyindex.aspx. 
46 The latest: General Assembly, Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, 15 January 2019. UN Doc. A/RES/73/163. 
But also see UN Doc. A/RES/57/211, UN Doc. UN Doc. A/RES/53/146, UN Doc.  A/RES/47/196, UN Doc. 
A/RES/46/121. 
47 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, 28 June 1996. UN Doc. 
E/C.12/2001/10, para. 1 and 8. 
48 Formisano Prada, 2011, p. 18. 
49 Economic and Social Council, Human Rights and Extreme Poverty: Report of the Independent Expert Arjun 
Sengupta, March 2006. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/43, para.10. 
50 BBC News, 2002. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/.low/talking_point/forum/1673034.stm 
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The idea that extreme poverty in itself is a violation or a denial of human rights is mainly 
developed by the OHCHR in its publication Human Rights and Poverty Reduction: a 
Conceptual Framework. The main idea sustained in the publication is that the development and 
human rights agenda are not in fact two different agendas, but two mutually reinforcing 
approaches to the very same goal.51 
 
Stating that poverty itself is a violation of human rights is nevertheless different than stating 
that poverty and the non-fulfilment of any kind of human rights have conceptually the same 
meaning. It is clear that there are several cases where there is a violation of human rights and 
no connection to poverty whatsoever. For example, if a government denies its political 
opposition the right to speak freely or even imprison its opposition for political reasons, 
although there is a clear violation of human rights law, this violation cannot be linked with 
poverty.52 In the same way, and as argued by Doz Costa, not every deprivation, meaning every 
situation where a basic human right is needed but not fulfilled, constitutes a violation of human 
rights.53 As an example, to restrict an individual to use religious symbols in public institutions 
can be considered a deprivation, but in many cases such deprivation is not considered as a 
violation of international human rights laws, once the rights of others are also taken in 
consideration. 
 
The idea that poverty itself is a violation of human rights takes the previous discussed capability 
approach54 to define poverty and sustains that freedom is the common denominator that 
connects extreme poverty and human rights. Basic freedoms are recognized as fundamentally 
important to guarantee a minimal level of human dignity. Those are, for example, the freedom 
to avoid hunger, diseases and illiteracy. If someone has failed to acquire these basic freedoms 
it means that this person’s rights to these freedoms have not been realized. In the words of the 
OHCHR “poverty can be defined equivalently as either the failure of basic freedoms – from 
the perspective of capabilities, or the non-fulfilment of rights to those freedoms – from the 
perspective of human rights”.55 
                                               
51 OHCHR, 2004, p. 3. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Doz Costa, 2008, p. 81. 
54 The capability approach is used by other international agencies such as the UNDP in the Human Development 
Reports (HDR). 
55 OHCHR, 2004, p. 10. 
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The OHCHR sustains that for a deprivation to be considered as a violation of human rights 
law, it must fulfil two premises. Firstly, the right in question must correspond to the capability 
that is considered basic by a certain society, for example, the right to be free from illiteracy 
correspond to the right of education and the right to be free from hunger to the right to adequate 
food. It is also argued that certain basic capabilities are common to all societies. Secondly, the 
deprivation must be caused by economic constraints, meaning that the lack of “economic 
resources must play a role in the causal chain leading to the non-fulfilment of the human 
rights”.56 
 
Lack of personal income is only one possible source for extreme poverty. Inadequate access to 
public services and goods can also be pointed as a cause of poverty. It is also sustained that 
capability poverty is not equivalent to a uniformly low level of command on economic 
resources because people have different means to convert resources into capabilities. People 
have different biological characteristics and live in different climatic and social   environments. 
As an example, the amount of food or clothes needed for a person to have a minimally 
acceptable level of those goods may vary.57 
 
The OHCHR argues that all human rights are relevant when addressing poverty. It is not argued 
that all rights can be used as reference in the definition of extreme poverty, but instead, that all 
rights must be taken into consideration for elaborating strategies for addressing the issue, 
following the interdependence and indivisibility logic of human rights. In other words, while 
only certain rights can be used to define poverty, an anti-poverty strategy needs to take into 
consideration a much wider range of international human rights. It is sustained that human 
rights are relevant to poverty on three different levels of relevance, (i) constitutive, (ii) 
instrumental and (iii) constraint-based.58 If the right in question falls within the two premises 
previously discussed - corresponds to a capability that is considered basic in a given society 
and, at the same time, inadequate economic resources play a role for the non-fulfilment of that 
right - then it has a constitutive relevance over poverty.59  
 
                                               
56 Ibid. p .3. 
57 Ibid. p. 8-9. 
58 Ibid. p. 11. 
59 Ibid. 
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Instrumental relevance is related to the ability of some rights to promote the reduction of 
poverty. The OHCHR presented two different types of instrumental relevance, causative and 
evaluative. Causative and evaluative are both related to civil and political rights. In relation to 
the causative relevance, it is argued that in a society where participation and accountability is 
exercised effectively it is unlikely that symptoms of poverty would be manifested. In other 
words, in a democracy with a reasonable degree of civil and political freedoms where the media 
can speak freely, the government tends to take all the measures to prevent the symptoms of 
poverty (for example: famine and a homeless crisis) to affect its population. Those measures 
would be taken because the government would fear for bad publicity and strikes. In the same 
way, evaluative relevance is related to the idea that poverty requires different forms of social 
evaluation. Even to define which capabilities are basic in a determined society, the community 
shall be able to be fully consulted and such participation is only possible when a wide range of 
human rights is respected.60 
 
Constrained-based relevance is related to which kinds of measures are permissible when 
tackling poverty. Policies which focus on population and birth control for example, cannot have 
as strategy to impose forced sterilization on the population once this measure would violate the 
populations’ rights to privacy and personal integrity.61 In that case, although the content of a 
human right may not have a constitutive relevance to poverty nor have any instrumental value 
for reducing poverty, this right must still be respected when addressing poverty.62 The 
conclusion is that although only a few human rights are part of the definition of poverty, a large 
range of rights are vital in any attempt to discuss and to formulate policies for poverty.63 
 
The valuable work of the OHCHR and the definition proposed by the CESCR are important in 
translating the multidimensionality of poverty to the human rights language and connecting 
poverty with the principles of indivisibility and interdependence of international human rights. 
However, once extreme poverty as such is not established by any binding instrument as a 
violation of human rights, this approach, which defines poverty as a violation of human rights, 
does not give the extremely poor the tools to operationalize their demand and seek redress and 
remedies to their situation in courts or judicial bodies. As sustained before, this fact does not 
                                               
60 Ibid. p. 11. 
61 Ibid. p. 12. 
62 Ibid. p. 11. 
63 Ibid. 
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mean, however, that extremely poor people have no protection under international law once 
there are human rights which have a straightforward connection to extreme poverty, or in the 
word of OHCHR, have a constitutive relevance to extreme poverty. It is through those rights 
that extremely poor people can seek judicial protection to redress their situation. 
 
It is important, therefore, to establish which human rights have a constitutive relevance to 
extreme poverty. Although the OHCHR did not clarify at the occasion which right shall be 
considered as constitutive to poverty, when combining the definition of constitutive relevance 
with the definition of extreme poverty through the capability approach proposed in the first 
section, it is possible to clarify which human rights fall within this category. The table below 
translates the freedoms presented in the definition of poverty into the language of human rights 
law. 
 
Table 1. Constitutive rights to extreme poverty 
Constitutive rights to extreme poverty  
Basic freedoms  Correspondent human rights 
To be nourished  Right to adequate standards of living 
(specially the right to food and the right to 
water) 
To enjoy adequate living conditions Right to adequate standards of living  
To lead normal spans of life  Right to health and the right to life  
To read and write Right to education  
 
The findings of the table are also compatible with the premises of studies related to 
multidimensional poverty. In those studies, poverty is related to seven deprivations related to 
the access to shelter, food, water, sanitation, health care, education (and information64)65. 
 
                                               
64 Information is not included here as a right, but it will be explored when analyzing poverty and access to justice.  
65 See UNICEF, 2016; de Milliano, Marlous and Plavgo, Ilze. Analysing Child Poverty and Deprivation in sub-
Saharan Africa, Office of Research Working Paper: WP-2014-19, UNICEF Office of Research, Florence, 
November 2014, p. 18 and ECLAC-UNICEF. La pobreza infantil en América Latina y el Caribe, CEPAL, Chile, 
December 2010. 
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In conclusion, although a vast range of human rights have to be taken in consideration when 
addressing extreme poverty, due its multidimensional facet, there are four human rights which 
have a constitutive relevance to extreme poverty. Those are: the right to life, the right to 
adequate standards of living (including housing, food and water) the right to health, the right 
to education and the most basic human right of all, the right to life. These are consequently the 
rights on which the next chapters will focus. It is important, therefore, to establish in which 
legal instruments these rights can be found, the nature and scope of states obligations and their 
content. Hence, those are the aim of the next two chapters.  
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3. The International Framework for the Protection of the Extremely Poor 
3.1. Constitutive Rights to Extreme Poverty in International Instruments 
 
This section presents the most relevant instruments at international and regional levels which 
embrace the human rights, which have a constitutive relevance for extreme poverty. At 
international level there are two main instruments: (i) The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and (ii) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR). The ICCPR and ICESCR are binding instruments which, together with the 
Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHR), compose the International Bill of Human 
Rights. Moreover, the both international covenants have been ratified by a vast majority of the 
UN member states.66 Binding instruments compel the states to take measures to protect and 
implement the rights prescribed by them and offer effective remedies in case of a violation. 
 
The two international covenants embrace all the rights established in the previous chapters as 
having a constitutive relevance to extreme poverty, as summarized in the following table. 
 
Table 2. International treaties in connection to extreme poverty 
International treaties 
Instruments  Articles Rights 
International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1966) 
      11 
 
12  
13 
-Adequate standards of living, including 
adequate food, housing and water67  
-Health 
-Education 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966) 
6 -Life 
 
 
The rights which have a constitutive relevance to extreme poverty are presented in two different 
sets of rights. The right to life is presented as a civil and political right while the right to an 
                                               
66 Riedel, 2012, p.132.  
67 The right to water was later understood as a part of the right to adequate standards of living in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These features will be further explained in the Chapter 4. 
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adequate standard of living, the right to health and the right to education are prescribed in the 
economic, social and cultural set.  
 
In order to claim a violation at international level, a person must be in the jurisdiction of a state 
which has ratified one instrument which contents the rights understood as constitutive for 
extreme poverty. Admissibility criteria usually include that all available domestic remedies 
must be exhausted, that the same matter is not being examined by another international body, 
and there is also a time limit for submitting a complaint. Communications of both covenants 
can be submitted on the behalf of other (with their consent). 
 
At international level, there are other conventions that reinforce the content of the constitutive 
rights to poverty focusing on specific and most vulnerable groups which can also be victims of 
extreme poverty68. For example, the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women prescribes the right to health focusing on women,69 the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (1989) prescribes the right to health, especially in relation to diminishing 
child mortality, combat malnutrition and the right to adequate standard of living to child’s 
development.70 The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (1990) prescribes again that immigrants shall have 
access to health and education.71 
 
At regional level there are two continents that are deeply affected by extreme poverty and have 
own regional human rights protection systems: Africa and America (Latin -America, 
specifically). Extreme poverty is a problem that mostly affect the developing world, once the 
poverty observed in developed countries remains relative.72 The Sub-Saharan Africa is the 
region most affected by the issue. Still in 2015, 41.1% of its population faced extreme poverty. 
The percentage of people affected by extreme poverty in Middle East and North Africa in the 
same year was 5%.73  In Latin America and Caribbean, 4.1% of the population faced extreme 
                                               
68 About children’s poverty see UNICEF, 2016, p.3.About feminization of poverty and human rights see: 
Kuosmanen, Jaakko; Campbell, Meghan; Hilly, Laura. Introduction - Women and Poverty: A Human Rights 
Perspective. 24 Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 469 (2016) and Fredman, Sandra. Women and Poverty - A Human Rights 
Approach, 24 Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 494 (2016). 
69 CEDAW, 1979 art. 12. 
70 CRC, 1989, art. 24 and 27.  
71 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 
1990, art. 28 and 30-43. 
72 Sachs, 2005, p. 20. 
73 World Bank, 2019b available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview. 
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poverty in 2015.74The African continent is covered by the African (Banjul) Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights (1981) and the American continent is covered by the American Convention 
on Human Rights (1969) and its additional protocol. The rights which have a constitutive 
relevance to extreme poverty are summarized in the table below. 
 
Table 3. Regional Instruments in connection to extreme poverty 
Regional Instruments75  
Instruments  Articles Right 
Africa    
African [Banjul] Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights (1981)  
4 
16 
17 
22 
   
 
-Life  
-Health 
-Education 
-Economic, social and cultural 
development 
  
Americas  
American Convention on Human 
Rights (1969)  
4 
26 
-Life 
-Progressive development (realization 
of economic, social, educational, 
scientific, and cultural rights) 
Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human 
Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 
"Protocol of San Salvador" (1988)  
10 
12 
13 
 
 
- Health 
- Right to Food 
- Education 
  
 
 
As demonstrated in the table, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights’ is an 
instrument that presents a comprehensive set of rights in connection to poverty. It does not 
include the right to adequate standard of living but it embraces the right to economic, social 
and cultural development in its article 22. Furthermore the African Commission has already 
                                               
74 World Bank, 2018b, available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview. 
75 OHCHR, 2019, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Poverty/Pages/IStandards.aspx. 
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recognized in the Serac case76 that the right to housing and food is implicit in the Charter in 
connection to the right to life, health and economic, social and cultural development. 
  
The African Commission is the quasi-judicial body in the African system and it can receive 
communications concerning violations of any individual, group or NGOs, at their behalf or of 
others.77 In the beginning of the year 2019 only seven states have ratified the protocol 
recognizing the competence of the African Court on Human and People’ right, the judicial body 
of the system, which started its operation in the end of year 2006.78 
 
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) also embraces almost all the rights which 
have a constitutive relevance to extreme poverty. Extreme poverty is a central issue to the 
system. The Charter of the Organization of American States has among its purposes and 
principles the eradication of extreme poverty. Extreme poverty is understood as an obstacle to 
the full democratic development in the region.79 A shared responsibility of the states regarding 
the issue is also established.80 The system even has a general secretariat, which function is to 
promote economic, social, juridical, educational, scientific, and cultural relations among the 
States, with special focus on the cooperation for the elimination of extreme poverty.81 
Furthermore, the article 34 presents several basic goals which are, among other things, the 
elimination of extreme poverty. 
 
In the Inter-American system, the Inter-American Commission is the quasi-judicial body 
responsible for the individual petition system. It also monitors the human rights situation of the 
member states, sets priority to thematic areas and prepares studies and countries reports. Quasi-
judicial bodies respond to claims and have the power to declare that violations have occurred. 
They also indicate or recommend that violations have to be corrected. However, there is no 
consensus on whether those decisions are considered to be binding. According to the Inter-
American Court, the States have the obligation to make every effort to comply with the 
                                               
76 Social and Economic Rights Action Center & the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria 
(Communication No. 155/96). 
77 See ACHPR, Information Sheet No 2: Guidelines for the Submission of Communications, African Commission 
Secretariat, 1987, p.7.  
 78African Union, 2019. Available at https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36396-sl-
protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights.pdf 
79 Charter of the OAS, 1948, Article 2 (g). 
80 Ibid. Article 3 (f). 
81 Ibid. Article 111. 
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Commission’s recommendations.82 The Inter-American Commission can receive complaints 
of any individual or group of individuals, including recognized NGOs (non-governmental 
organizations).83  It can also transfer contentious cases to the Inter-American Court, the judicial 
body of the system that can issue binding decisions. If the Court finds a violation, it will ask 
for remedy and fair compensation to the injured party. The decision of the Court is final, which 
means that no appeal is possible. States are under the obligation to comply with the judgement 
of the judicial bodies, which can also supervise their compliance. 84 Still, some countries which 
are members of the ACHR have not yet granted contentious jurisdiction to the Court, such as 
Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (withdrawal in 1999).85 
3.2. Nature and Scope of Legal Obligation 
3.2.1. The Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights 
 
As previously mentioned, the rights which have a constitutive relevance to poverty are part of 
two different sets of rights. The right to life is included in the civil and political set, while the 
right to an adequate standard of living, the right to health, and the right to education are 
understood as social and economic rights. Although the later set of rights was already presented 
on the ICESCR in 1966 and before that on the UDHR in 1948, economic, social and cultural 
rights have only recently become recognized as justiciable and legally enforceable rights. The 
right to adequate food, for example, had until 1996 a mere symbolic value.86 Therefore, the 
right to food was not considered as a concrete or immediate obligation and victims of hunger 
could not seek judicial remedies to redress their situation.87 
 
The nature and scope of international legal obligations of the ICCPR were considered to be 
clear and straightforward, making civil and political rights clearly concrete and enforceable 
rights. However, differences between the provisions of the covenants prevented that economic 
and social rights to be immediately recognised in the same way. 
 
                                               
82 Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment of September 17, 1997, (Ser.C) No. 33, para.80. 
83 American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, Art. 44. 
84 Quiroga, 2012, p. 537-538. 
85 IACHR, 2019. Available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm 
86 Since the World Food Summit in 1996, followed by the publication of the General Comment No 12 in 1999, 
the right to food has gained visibility and was transformed into an operational tool, currently leading to litigations 
before national courts, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter.  
87 Schutter, 2015, p. 13. 
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The article 2 of both covenants (2 (1) in the ICCPR and 2(2) in the ICESCR) guarantee that the 
rights prescribed in their content shall be guaranteed in accordance to the principle of non-
discrimination, meaning “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”.88 
However, the second part of the same article contains distinctions that led to the discussion of 
the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
The articles that prescribes the nature and scope of both International Covenant can be seen in 
the table below. 
 
Table 4. Scope of legal obligations in the ICCPR and in the ICESCR 
ICCPR Article 2(2)  ICESCR Article 2(1) 
“Where not already provided for by existing 
legislative or other measures, each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
take the necessary steps, in accordance with 
its constitutional processes and with the 
provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt 
such laws or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant.”89 
(emphasis added) 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical, 
to the maximum of its available resources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures.”90 (emphasis added) 
 
Some has argued that when comparing the article 2 of both Covenants it seems that the legal 
scope of the ICESCR is vague and imprecise, which makes it hard to determine what the legal 
obligations of the states are.91 While the obligations under article 2 of the ICCPR were 
considered to be immediate, absolute in nature and not limitable, the obligations in the ICESCR 
were qualified and limited, since its full realization could be achieved progressively and it was 
limited to the States’ maximum available resources. Some has argued that the rights in the 
ICCPR had a high degree of determination and low degree of discretion. Considering that the 
word ‘necessary’ is left out of the ICESCR, it was considered that the obligations of the states 
for these set of rights had a low degree of determination and a high degree of discretion. In 
other words, it was argued that there was a bigger margin of appreciation for states to decide 
                                               
88 ICCPR, 1966, Art. 2 (1). 
89 ICCPR, 1966, Art. 2 (2). 
90 ICESCR, 1966, Art. 2 (1). 
91 Vizard, 2006, p.158-159. 
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on the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights.92 Going even further, it was generally 
claimed that civil and political rights are ‘real’ rights, legally binding and could be immediately 
secured in positive law while economic, social and cultural rights are mere programmatic 
policy goals, a different category without legal significance.93 
 
However, in the last three decades the normative standards have evolved in the field. Also, 
general comments were set by authoritative bodies at the international level to clarify the 
content, nature and scope of obligations towards human rights. The authoritative body 
responsible for the ICCPR is the Human Rights Committee. The Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights is responsible for the ICESCR.94  
 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted the general comment 3, the 
most important interpretive guide regarding the states obligations under the ICESCR in 1990. 
General Comment 3 sustains that although the full realization of economic, social and cultural 
rights can be fulfilled progressively, steps towards their realization must be taken by all 
appropriate means, including administrative, financial, educational and social measures. From 
a legal perspective, it is expected that states would adopt legislative measures prescribing 
economic, social and cultural rights and provide judicial remedies when these rights are 
violated. Additionally, the steps shall be taken within a reasonable time after the ratification of 
the Covenant.95 These steps shall be “deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible 
towards meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant”.96 
 
The progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an immediate obligation 
of the states, it is not conditional on resources and must be read in accordance to the overall 
objective of the Covenant, which establishes a clear obligation of states to fulfil these rights.97 
To guarantee that economic, social and cultural rights are exercised without discrimination is 
also a provision which has an immediate effect. The idea of the use of the term “progressive 
realization” is to recognize that the full realization of all economic, social and cultural rights 
                                               
92 Ibid. p.158-159. 
93 Vizard, 2006, p.158-159. 
94 Scheinin, 2012, p. 666-667 
95 CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations, 14 December 1990, UN. Doc. 
E/1991/23, para. 2 and 5. 
96 Ibid, para. 2. 
97 CESCR General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations, 14 December 1990, UN. Doc. 
E/1991/23, paras. 9. See also: Limburg Principles, 1987, principles: 1, 21, 22, 23, 24; and Maastricht Guideline, 
1997, guideline 8. 
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could not be generally achieved by states in a short period. Therefore, progressive realization 
should not be interpreted as depriving the obligation to fulfil the meaningful content of the 
rights. Instead, it is a flexible device reflecting the realities and difficulties involved in ensuring 
the full realization of those rights.  Based in General Comment 3, Riedel sustains that economic, 
social and cultural rights “are not variable, up to the free policy choices of states, nor do they 
lay down a double standard of morality vis-à-vis developing and developed states: rather, they 
make the distinction based on the fact that states start from various initial factual bases”.98 
 
Article 2 does not release states to move as expeditiously as possible towards the full realization 
of those rights. States cannot use the progressive realization provision as a pretext for non-
compliance. Furthermore, any deliberately retrogressive measure have to be fully justified in 
the context of the full use of the maximum available resources.99  
 
States have different sets of obligations in regard to each right. Those obligations are (i) 
obligation to respect, (ii) obligation to protect and (iii) obligation to fulfil. The obligation to 
respect generally refers to the State’s duty to not interfere on the enjoyment of human rights.100 
For example, it will be considered a violation of the right to water if states would arbitrarily 
disconnect water services or facilities, or if states would increase the price of water services in 
a discriminatory or in an unaffordable way.101 As another example, states would be respecting 
the right to adequate standards of living by refraining from interfering in the already existing 
levels of enjoyment of the right to food, housing and water by ensuring that those who produce 
their own food would continue to have access to the land on which their livelihood depends.102 
 
The obligation to protect refers to states’ due to take measures to ensure that enterprises or 
individuals (private parties) do not deprive people of their access to relevant rights.103 In the 
example of the right to water, it would be considered a violation if states would fail to enforce 
                                               
98 Riedel, 2012, p. 139. 
99 CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations, 14 December 1990, UN. Doc. 
E/1991/23, para. 9. See also: Limburg Principles 1, 21, 22, 23, 24; and Maastricht Guideline 8. 
100  Langford, 2008, p. 14. 
101 CESCR. General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), 20 January 2003. 
UN. Doc E/C.12/2002/11, para. 44 (a). 
102 Schutter, 2015, p. 13. 
103  CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the Covenant), 12 May 1999. 
UN. Doc.  E/C.12/1999/5, para. 15. 
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laws to prevent the contamination and inequitable extraction of water by private parties or if 
states fail to protect water systems from a third party interference, damage or destruction.104 
 
Finally, the obligation to fulfil is related both to the obligation to facilitate access to a right and 
the obligation to provide. In other words, it means that states must proactively engage to 
strengthen  access  to the rights and when an individual or group of individuals are unable, for 
reasons beyond their control, to enjoy economic and social rights, the state has the obligation 
to provide the right directly.105 Insufficient expenditure or misallocation of resources which 
would result in the non-enjoyment of the right especially by vulnerable groups, would be an 
example of violation in this case.106 It would also be considered a violation if the state would 
allow starvation when people are in desperate need and are unable to provide food for 
themselves.107 
 
The obligation to fulfil has presented a controversial question in the jurisprudence. It has been 
argued that in accordance to the doctrine of separation of powers, the adjudication of economic 
and social rights would be considered anti-democratic in nature once issues related to social 
policy and the allocation of resources should be ruled by elected representatives. Additionally, 
it has been argued that courts would not have the experience or skill to deal with questions of 
policy nature. These concerns have, however, been rejected in recent years for being 
oversimplified and overstated. These arguments are weak to support the non-justiciability of 
economic and social right because the same concerns can be equally applied to the set of civil 
and political rights, once in some cases they also require the implementation of policies.108 
Additionally, Langford clarifies that courts are constitutionally empowered to make judicial 
review regarding the realization of economic and social rights. To address violations and apply 
remedies are simply part of their constitutional job. In this sense, courts are not asked to make 
policies or laws, they are asked to review existing laws and policies applying a set of criteria.109 
In the same way, Bilchitz clarifies that policies and rights are different conceptions. Policies 
                                               
104 CESCR General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), 20 January 2003, 
UN. Doc E/C.12/2002/11, para. 44 (b). 
105 CESCR, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the Covenant), 12 May 1999. UN. 
Doc.  E/C.12/1999/5, para. 15. 
106 CESCR, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), 20 January 2003. 
UN. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, paras. 44 (c). 
107 General Assembly, The Right to Food. Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler, 23 July 2001. UN Doc. A/56/210, para. 29.  
108 IDLO, 2015, p. 23. 
109 Langford, 2008, p. 21 and 31-34. 
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are up to governments, but courts should supervise and guarantee that peoples’ basics rights 
are fulfilled. Therefore, courts shall be able to establish standards of economic and social 
provisions needed to guarantee the enjoyment of those rights.110 
 
Due to these clarifications, the debate of the justiciability of economic and social rights has 
been resolved and this set of rights are firmly established as legally enforceable human rights. 
In other words, it is nowadays clear that there is the possibility for individuals, or a group of 
individuals, to claim a violation of economic, social and cultural right before a judicial body 
that can order remedies if a violation is determined. There are a vast jurisprudence supporting 
the enforceability of those rights.111 The role of judges as guardians of the constitution are 
primordial for the enforceability of economic and social rights, having a transformative 
potential for combating poverty.112 
   
An explicit example in the poverty jurisprudence concerning the justiciability of economic and 
social rights is found in the Ibrahim Sangor Osman case. The case was related to the right to 
adequate housing and the prohibition of forced eviction. At that occasion, the Court recognized 
that the state’s organs have the duty to address the needs of vulnerable groups, especially the 
extreme poor. 113 
 
The Constitution of Kenya entrenches both civil and political rights and also social and economic rights, 
 and makes both justiciable. It is an acknowledgment of the fundamental interdependence of these rights. 
 The interdependence is out of the realization that people living without the basic necessities of life are 
 deprived of human dignity, freedom and equality. Democracy itself is enhanced when citizens have 
 access to the basic necessities of life.114 
 
As suggested by Porter, the current debate is no longer related to whether economic and social 
rights are justiciable, but rather to understand how they should be adjudicated.115 Finally, States 
have obligations regarding the minimum core content of human rights.  
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3.2.2. Minimum Core Obligations 
 
The CESCR establishes the idea of a minimum core obligation in the General Comment 3, 
regarding the nature of States obligation. The minimum core obligations are set to ensure that 
a minimum essential level of each of the rights is satisfied in all the States Parties. Those are 
related to essential food, primary health care, basic shelter, housing and the most basic form of 
education.116 
 
According to the CESCR the obligation toward the fulfilment of a minimum core does not fall 
within the “progressive realization” and has immediate effect. In the same way, justifying the 
lack of compliance due to the lack of available resources is restricted. For states party to be 
able to claim that a lack of available resources is the reason why they are failing to fulfil its 
minimum core obligations “[States] must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use 
all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those 
minimum obligations”.117 Additionally, even when the state’s resources are proven to be 
inadequate, there is still an obligation to ensure, as wide as possible, the enjoyment of the 
relevant rights under the circumstances.118 
  
General Comment 3 clarifies that a state party “in which any significant number of individuals 
is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, 
or of the most basic forms of education”119 is failing to fulfil its obligations. In other words, a 
minimum protective floor shall be established for every right and if this floor is not provided, 
states are found in non-compliance with Article 2.120 It is argued, therefore, that the minimum 
core obligation aims to address extreme poverty as a social phenomenon. Therefore, although 
the states have the obligation to fulfil its obligation as a matter of individual rights, the 
minimum core provisions shows the intention to apply the concept in places where many are 
deprived of basic essential services or, in other words, in places where extreme poverty is 
found. The minimum core discussion is about developing countries. The concept is built to 
give priority for those who experience situations that can threaten their survival capacities.121 
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Therefore, it would not be possible to find developed countries in violation with the minimum 
core, once their population have access to those essential basic services. They are nevertheless 
required to improve the levels of provisions until the full realization of the rights once all the 
states (developing and developed) are under the obligation towards the full realization of those 
rights.122 
 
The idea behind the minimum core obligation is that each human right contain an essential 
core. The minimum core obligations adopted by the CESCR is, therefore, a methodology for 
states to operationalize the essential core of economic and social rights.123 There are not “core” 
and “non-core” rights, rather, one right can involve different levels of provisions and the states 
have to provide the minimum core immediately and increase the level of provisions 
progressively.124 
 
Young sustains that the minimum core conception reflects a minimalist strategy in terms of 
rights that aims to maximize the gains by minimizing the goals.125 It offers an understanding 
of which direction the “deliberative, concrete and targeted” steps shall be taken and aims to set 
a baseline of economic and social protection across different levels of available resources and 
different economic policies. Bilchitz argues that the recognition of a minimum core attempts 
to prioritize survival interest and that it must be realized without delay. It is argued that without 
the protection of people’s survival necessities, all other rights become meaningless.126 The idea 
of survival is also adopted by Riedel, who understands the minimum core as the obligation of 
states to provide a “survival kit” or an “existential minimum” of rights to everyone.127  
 
Some national courts128 have already recognized a minimum core of some economic, social 
and cultural rights. An example, in Quevedo, Miguel Ángel y Otros c/Aguas Cordobesas SA129 
the Argentinian Court established the minimum amount of water to guarantee basic hygiene 
and health conditions to an average family. At regional level, the African commission have 
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established the minimum standards related to the right to shelter and food in Serac case130. 
Both cases will be further explored in the following chapter. 
 
However, other domestic courts have not yet adopted the idea of a minimum core. In the 
Grootboom case131, a case related to the right to housing, the South African Constitutional 
Court did not recognize the minimum core. The Court argued that the lack of sufficient 
information to determine what the minimum core obligation would be in the context of the 
constitution. In the TAC case, it stated that it was impossible to guarantee everyone access to a 
core immediately132 and in the Soobramoney case it considered the economic rights being 
dependent upon available resources.133 
 
Bilchitz refutes the argument that the South African Constitutional Court would not have 
sufficient information regarding the basic needs related to these rights. Bilchitz explains that 
universal standards must be met in order for an obligation to be fulfilled. To the author, 
establishing a minimum core is not to establish in which means economic and social rights 
shall be realized, rather, it shall be a standard of provision that are necessary to meet people’s 
basic needs. The minimum core content does not vary in accordance to the characteristics of a 
specific group, rather, it is a general notion applicable to all human beings. In the Grootboom 
case, the community was clear about what they wanted: protection from elements and access 
to an environment that would not compromise their health. In this sense, no difficulty should 
be found in identifying the nature of the most basic need in relation to right to housing, nor 
would a vast source of information be necessary.134 
 
Bilchitz also refutes the argument that it is impossible to guarantee everyone’ access to a core 
content immediately. The author sustains that this rigid, absolutist and not realist approach is 
unfair: “the minimum core approach does require us to take a rigid stance in one respect: it 
requires us to recognize that it is simply unacceptable for any human being to have to live 
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without sufficient resources to maintain their survival”.135 To Bilchitz, the first point to be 
considered is that the minimum core approach is set to specify priorities and that priorities shall 
be given for those who have their survival capability threatened. When survival is at threat, 
states cannot treat the situation as one issue that can be dealt among many others. In this 
situation, states have the obligation to assist these people.136  
 
It is clarified that the lack of available resources does not affect the right that a person has, only 
the capacity of the government to realize them. In that case, the obligations of states may 
change but not the content of the right itself.137 States’ obligations are defined regardless their 
economic resources but what is required of them depends on its available resources and 
capability.138 Following the normative guidance of the general comment 3, when the 
government claims that it is not possible to fulfil core rights, the Court shall, then, require proof 
that the government is unable to do so.139   
 
Additionally to the standards established in the General Comment 3 (Essential foodstuff, 
essential primary health care, basic shelter, basic housing and most basic forms of education) 
the CESCR goes even further in the establishment of benchmarks to be followed when 
interpreting the minimum core in other General Comments. Although the General Comment 
related to the right to housing doesn’t specify the minimum core of this right, the ICESCR have 
already established the minimum core content of the right to food, water, health and education, 
which will be explored in the next chapter.  
 
The minimum core obligations are set to protect the most vulnerable, the ones who lack basic 
shelter, food, water and health, and no group is more vulnerable to face those conditions than 
the extremely poor. Pogge argues that human rights deficits are currently mostly concentrated 
among the poor.140 UNICEF observed that, when it comes to “realizing their right to survive 
and develop, the odds are stacked against those from the poorest and most disadvantaged 
households”.141 It can be argued that the situations considered as a violation of the minimum 
core content are mostly concentrated among those who suffer from extreme poverty. Hunger, 
                                               
135 Bilchitz, 2003, p. 15. 
136 Ibid. p. 18. 
137 Ibid. p. 20-21. 
138 Ibid. p. 23. 
139 Ibid. p. 16. 
140 Pogge, 2005, p. 2. 
141 UNICEF, 2016, p. 9. 
Catherine Silvério Guisso 
31 
 
for example, is only faced by the extremely poor. Ahmed et al. made a survey among 20 
developing countries clarifying that poverty and hunger overlap and suggest that although not 
all extremely poor people suffer from hunger, all people in hunger are extremely poor, which 
is consistent with the fact that poverty is the primary cause of hunger.142 
 
Through the minimum core doctrine it is possible to establish a straightforward obligation of 
States towards the constitutive rights to extreme poverty or, in other words, it is possible to 
invoke obligations more directly, making it difficult for the state to reject the appeals related 
to those obligations.143 It is through the minimum core content that extreme poverty can be 
validated as a human rights violation. Therefore, it is expected that states would implement and 
give priority to policies to tackle extreme poverty.144 Sengupta has even suggested that, in order 
to meet with their international obligations, states would have to identify a small percent of its 
population as the most vulnerable (suffering from extreme poverty) and guarantee the 
fulfilment of a minimum level of some basic human rights prescribed in both international 
covenants.145 
 
The minimum core content of the constitutive rights to extreme poverty are inseparable from 
human dignity and especially connected to the principle of human survival.146 If the minimum 
core content of the rights which have a constitutive relevance to poverty were guaranteed, the 
vulnerabilities faced by extreme poor people would be overcome. In other words, the minimum 
core of those rights can provide the minimum essential level of basic services that, once 
respected, would make possible to live a life in dignity. In that sense, the development and 
advancement of those rights are expected to provide a solid base for the mitigation of extreme 
poverty.147 
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4. The Content and Applicability of Human Rights with Constitutive Relevance to 
Poverty 
4.1. The Right to Life 
 
The right to life is the first human right presented in this chapter because it is connected to 
extreme poverty through the freedom mostly related to people’s survival, the freedom to lead 
normal spans of life (see Table 1). Also, a severe denial of the freedom to enjoy adequate living 
conditions or to be nourished can ultimately lead to a violation of the right to life. As a 
consequence, more than being a premise for the enjoyment of all the other human rights,148 the 
right to life is closely connected to the minimum core content of the other rights which have a 
constitutive relevance to extreme poverty (the right to education being an exception). In other 
words, it is argued that when states fail to provide the minimum core content of the right to 
housing, food, water and health, as will be further discussed in this chapter, they can, 
consequently, also be violating the right to life. 
 
From the rights identified as having a constitutive relevance to extreme poverty, the right to 
life is the only one which belongs to civil and political set of rights. The right to life is 
prescribed in the ICCPR. According to article 6 “every human being has the inherent right to 
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”.149 
  
The Human Rights Committee updated the General Comment regarding the right to life on 
October of 2018 and stated that the right to life has to be interpreted widely. The right to life 
concerns the right for individuals to be free from acts or omissions that are intended or may be 
expected to cause their unnatural and premature death. Also, the right to life concerns the right 
to enjoy a life in dignity. In this context, a deprivation of the right to life would involve an 
intentional or foreseeable and preventable life-terminating harm or injury. States have the 
obligation to respect and to ensure the right to life by legislative and other measures and to 
guarantee effective remedies to all the victims of the violation of this right.150 
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Therefore, there are two obligations related to the right to life. The first is that states have the 
obligation to respect the right to life by not being responsible for unlawful deaths. Secondly, 
states have the obligation to ensure the right to life guaranteeing that their population have the 
necessary conditions to maintain their survival and to enjoy a life in dignity. Although the 
current jurisprudence also considers poverty when addressing cases related to the first 
obligation, the right to life is mostly connected to extreme poverty through the second 
obligation. Extreme poverty can lead people to die from preventable deaths, which includes 
starvation, malnutrition, preventable diseases and dehydration. Therefore, these deaths are 
related to the right to housing, food, water and health, more specifically to their core 
contents.151 
 
The right to life is explicitly connected to extreme poverty in two paragraphs of General 
Comment 36. Paragraph 23 prescribes the duty of states to take special and urgent measures to 
protect the life of people in situation of vulnerability whose lives are under particular risk. This 
include, among others, the protection of children in street situation (homeless children). 
Furthermore, paragraph 26 prescribes the duty of states to take measures to address general 
conditions in society that can rise direct threats to life or could potentially prevent individuals 
to live in dignity. That specifically includes situations where individuals face widespread 
hunger, malnutrition, extreme poverty and homelessness. States shall ensure access without 
delay to essential goods and services such as foodstuff, water, shelter, health-care, electricity, 
sanitation, social housing programs and access to medical care to reduce maternal mortality.152 
This provision is a clear connection between the right to life and the right to house, food, water 
and health. Additionally, the Committee highlights that the right to life is connected to the 
child’s rights prescribed in the article 24 of the same Covenant and urge for the adoption of 
special measures to protect the life of every child. These measures shall be guided by the best 
interest of the child, the need to ensure children’s survival, development and well-being.153  
 
There are substantive statistics supporting the connection of the right to life to the failures of 
the enjoyment of the minimum core content of the right to housing, food, water and health. As 
an example, a child born in sub-Saharan Africa is 12 times more likely to die before completing 
five years-old than those born in a high-income country. A child born in Sierra Leone is 30 
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times more likely to die before his or her fifth birthday than a child born in the United Kingdom. 
Within states, children who are born in the poorest 20% of the population, are almost twice as 
likely to die in this age group (0-5 years old) than those in the 20% richest, considering the 
global average. Of the 5.9 million under-five years old deaths in 2015, almost half were caused 
by pneumonia, diarrhoea, malaria, meningitis, tetanus, measles, sepsis and AIDS. Pneumonia 
and diarrhoea are the leading causes in the three regions with the highest rates of those deaths: 
Eastern and Southern Africa, South Asia and West and Central Africa. The most disadvantaged 
groups are the ones who suffer mostly from those diseases. In the case of pneumonia, children 
from the poorest households are also less likely taken to a health care centre. UNICEF predicts 
that in 2030, the global maternal mortality rate in low-income countries will be 161 deaths per 
100.000 live births which is five time the level of high-income countries.154 
 
Correlating the right to life to the right to adequate standards of living, UNICEF sustains that: 
 
Access to land, credit and property rights has a further impact on child survival prospects. Marginalized 
 groups living in informal settlements, illegal dwellings or urban slums are vulnerable to health threats 
 because of overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, high transportation costs, discriminatory practices and 
 lack of access to basic services. These factors also create barriers to demand, impeding the initial and 
 continued use of services by the most disadvantaged. When combined with low rates of immunization, 
 this situation exacerbates the transmission of diseases such as pneumonia, diarrhoea, measles and 
 tuberculosis.155 
 
Moreover, when water is insufficient, the poorest families are most likely to resort to unsafe 
water, which can lead to diseases such as cholera and diarrhoea. In low and middle- income 
countries there were a hundred deaths per day of under-five years old due to inadequate 
drinking water, sanitation and hygiene issues in 2012. The risk of morbidity for inappropriate 
water and sanitation is 38% higher on the age range of one to eleven months babies. Also, half 
of the deaths of children before five-years old are attributed to undernutrition.156 
 
Even when considering the right to education, which does not have a straightforward 
connection to survival, in South Asia and sub-Saharan African when mothers does not have 
education, their children are three times more likely to die than the children of mothers who 
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have secondary education. Education gives the tools women need to delay the space between 
births and to seek and access health care when their children fall ill.157 
 
The right to life have been successfully invoked in national courts to protect the extreme poor 
in connection to other rights which have a constitutive relevance to extreme poverty. In Ibrahim 
Sango Osman v Minister of State for Provincial Administration & Internal Security the 
petitioner claimed that more than 1.000 people were violently forcedly evicted from their 
homes on public land occupied since the 1940s. People were in a situation where no basic 
condition for living could be found. Some children were even forced to drop out from school. 
The High Court of Kenya acknowledged that the evictions forced the claimants to live without 
shelter, food, water, sanitation and health care, which is a violation of the ICESCR. The Court 
recognized that people living in conditions where their basic necessities to live are not satisfied 
are deprived of human dignity, freedom and equality. The Court highlighted that under Kenyan 
Bill of Rights, all organs of the states have the obligation to address the needs of vulnerable 
groups within the society. It found that the violation of the right to adequate housing, of the 
right to be free from hunger and of the right to water and sanitation also led to a violation of 
the right to life. The Court issued an injunction for the state to return the land for the petitioners 
and to reconstruct or provide alternative housing and other facilities for them.158  
 
In People’s Union for civil liberties v Union of India & Ors the state was accused of failing to 
address hunger conditions after starvation deaths occurred in Rajasthan. In other words, the 
state was failing to comply with the right to food, impacting the right to life. In this case, the 
Supreme Court of India made important considerations regarding the positive obligations of 
the state towards the extreme poor, including sustaining that economic constrains cannot be 
used as an excuse to not fulfil rights when the ability to people’s survival is threated, idea based 
on the minimum core obligations. In the words of the Court: 
 
It is the duty of the State and the Union Government to enforce the right to life of all persons particularly 
in situations of drought. The right to live enshrined in Article 21, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
includes the right to food. Persons below the poverty line or persons who are drought-affected and who 
do not have the financial capacity to purchase food grains are entitled to be looked after by the State and 
the Union Government in this regard. As these persons move from chronic malnutrition to acute 
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starvation, the State and Union Governments are duty bound to intervene and start relief works and 
distribute free grain to those unable to work. Financial constrains is no excuse when the issue is one of 
preservation of life, and has been rejected by the Supreme Court in this context.159 
 
Furthermore, the Court highlighted in the grounds of the decision that the state was negligent 
in performing their constitutional obligation to ensure the life of the people including living 
with dignity and have at least two square meals per day. The Court argued that the state have 
failed to use the available resources to drought relief, prevention of starvation and alleviation 
of misery.160 The Indian Supreme Court found that the right to life was compromised and held 
that the state was failing to implement existing legislation and policies. The Court required, 
among other things, the implementation of a Famine Code and the increase of the amount of 
grain available for each household to 10kg. The Court also required the government of India 
to release food stocks for the state of Rajasthan to cover all the expenses related to the relief 
measures.161 In interim measures, it was established that the State would have to provide a 
ration card for free grain for those without the means for supporting themselves. The Court also 
ordered the progressively implementation of a mid-day meal at schools, especially in the most 
poor areas.162 
 
At the international level, the Inter-American Court has also held that if minimum conditions 
to live a life in dignity is not guaranteed by the states, then the state is violating the right to life. 
To make this assessment, the Court took into consideration the minimum core content of 
economic and social rights, as can be observed in the following cases. In the Case of the 
Indigenous Community Yakye Axa v. Paraguay an indigenous community had been displaced 
from their traditional land which led the community to extreme poverty. The Court sustained 
that their right to life was abridged by not allowing them to access conditions that would enable 
them to live a decent life.163 The Court recognized that the precarious material conditions and 
the poverty that they were living at that time reflected the lack of the enjoyment of basic human 
rights to health, food and education and clarified that States are under the obligation to 
guarantee, protect and ensure the right to life through generating the minimum living conditions 
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that are compatible with the dignity of people.164 The Court evaluated whether the State had 
complied with its obligations regarding the right to life in combination to the general duty to 
respect rights and with the duty to progressively develop economic and social rights including 
the right to health, to food, and to a healthy environment.165 At the occasion, the Court found a 
violation of the right to life, the right to property and the right to judicial protection.166 
 
The Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v Paraguay is another case related to 
an indigenous community’s right to their traditional land where a violation of the right to life 
was found. The Court considered the principle of equality and non-discrimination regarding 
people living in poverty. In light of several alleged violations, the Court sustained that the case 
was an illustration of the persistence of structural discrimination practices.167 The Court also 
sustained that it is essential for States to give effective protection taking in consideration 
indigenous people’s “particularities, their economic and social characteristics, and also their 
situation of special vulnerability”.168 The Court acknowledged that the community’s ability to 
survive was restricted so as its ability to develop. The Court found a violation of the rights to 
property, judicial guarantee and protection and of the right to life.169 
 
In 2006, another case involving the right to ancestral land of indigenous community and 
extreme poverty was analysed: the Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. 
Paraguay. While waiting on the decision the community did not have access to basic human 
rights such as water, food, education and basic health services and their livelihood was in an 
imminent danger. The community members suffered from unemployment, illiteracy, 
malnutrition, lack of access to basic services, marginalization due to economic, geographic and 
cultural reasons and faced high rates of death from preventable diseases. Related to the state 
obligations towards the extreme poor, the Court highlighted that from general obligations 
“special duties are derived that can be determined according to the particular needs of 
protection of the legal persons, whether due to their personal conditions or because of the 
specific situation they have to face, such as extreme poverty, exclusion or childhood”.170 
                                               
164 Ibid. para. 158 (e) and162. 
165 Ibid. para. 163. 
166 Indigenous Community Yakye Axa v. Paraguay. Series C N. 125 (17/07/2005). 
167 Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Series C No. 214. (24/08/2010). 
168 Ibid. para. 270. 
169 Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Series C No. 214. (24/08/2010). 
170 Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, (29/03/ 2006) paras.154.  
Catherine Silvério Guisso 
38 
 
Paraguay was found in violation to the right to life, to property, to a fair trial and judicial 
protection among others.171 
 
Moreover, the Inter-American Court also related poverty with the first obligation towards the 
right of life, the obligation to respect this right by not being responsible for unlawful deaths. In 
order to do that, the Court focused in discrimination towards people living in poverty. It is 
argued in a report on poverty and human rights in the Americas made by the OAS that 
discrimination leads to stigmatization, social exclusion and violence.172 Non-discrimination is 
a clause valid for all articles presented in the Covenant, but the CCPR reinforces that the right 
to life must be respected without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, social origin, 
ethnicity and socioeconomic status.173 
 
States are expected to take all measures to prevent arbitrary deprivation of life committed by 
their law enforcement official. Those cases are a matter of “utmost gravity” in which the law 
must strictly control. Additionally, states have the obligation to take the necessary measures to 
protect the lives of those who are deprived of their liberty during arresting, detaining and 
imprisoning people. In those cases, states are responsible for people’s life and body integrity. 
Loss of life occurring on those circumstances must be properly investigated.174 
 
 In the Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras, two minors and two young adults were 
arrested and extrajudicially killed in a preventive detention operation of the Public Security 
Force in Tegucigalpa. The Court argued that the cause of the violation of the right to life were 
the victims’ social condition. Moreover, the Court sustained that the State did not provide the 
children an environment protected from violence and abuse. They lacked access to basic service 
and goods that would have given them the opportunity to development. In this case, the Court 
highlighted that states have the obligation to “ensure the protection of children and youngsters 
affected by poverty and socially alienated and, especially, to avoid their social stigmatization 
as criminals”.175 Honduras was found violating many rights of the Inter-American Convention, 
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including, among others, the right to life, to humane treatment, the prohibition of torture, the 
right to personal liberty and security, to a fair trial and the right of the child. 
 
The Case of Uzcátegui et al. v. Venezuela was related to the execution of Néstot José Uzcátegui 
by the state police. At the time, no one was sent to trial nor punished for the execution. 
Additionally, it was argued that Uzcátegui’s brother, who was in search for justice for his 
brother’s death, was being persecuted. The Court made considerations about the right to 
property of people living in poverty, once the house of the Uzcátegui family was damaged 
during the raid. 176 The Court sustained that the damage to their property had a great impact 
considering the socio economic and vulnerability state of the family and sustained that “States 
must take into account that groups of people living in adverse circumstances and with fewer 
resources, such as those living in poverty, experience an increase in the extent to which their 
rights are affected, precisely because of their more vulnerable situation.”177 Venezuela was 
found violating many rights of the Inter-American Convention, including, among others, the 
right to life, the right to property, to humane treatment, to personal liberty, to a fair trial and to 
judicial protection. 
 
Another relevant and important case concerning the right to life in the poverty jurisprudence is 
the Case of Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala, also known as the Case of the Street 
Children. At the occasion, the Inter-American Court analysed the two obligations related to the 
right to life combined. It was first in this case, in 1999, that the Court established that the right 
to life covers not only the right of not being deprived of life arbitrarily but also the right to have 
access to the necessary and minimum conditions for living in dignity. The case is about the 
kidnapping, torturing and death of four minors and the murder of a fifth one by members of the 
security forces.178 The Court held that when the state violates the rights of children in 
vulnerable and risk situations they are victims of a double aggression. Firstly, because the State 
failed to prevent them to live in misery, a situation which deprives them to the minimum 
conditions to live a life in dignity and where the development of their personality could be full. 
Secondly, because it violates their right to physical, mental and moral integrity, including their 
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lives.179 That is a very meaningful and powerful statement which established that the Court 
recognizes that being in misery, or facing extreme poverty, is a violation of human rights. 
 
In the light of Article 19 of the American Convention, the Court wishes to record the particular gravity 
of the fact that a State Party to this Convention can be charged with having applied or tolerated a 
systematic practice of violence against at risk children in its territory. When States violate the rights of 
at-risk children, such as “street children”, in this way, it makes them victims of a double aggression. 
First, such States do not prevent them from living in misery, thus depriving them of the minimum 
conditions for a dignified life and preventing them from the “full and harmonious development of their 
personality”, even though every child has the right to harbor a project of life that should be tended and 
encouraged by the public authorities so that it may develop this project for its personal benefit and that 
of the society to which it belongs. Second, they violate their physical, mental and moral integrity and 
even their lives.180 
4.2. The Right to Adequate Standards of Living Including Housing, Food and Water 
4.2.1. The Right to Adequate Standards of Living 
 
The right to an adequate standard of living is connected to two basic freedoms: the freedom to 
be nourished and the freedom to enjoy adequate living conditions. The right to an adequate 
standard of living is straightforwardly connected to poverty. Eide argues that in purely material 
terms, the right to an adequate standard of living implies a living above the poverty line. The 
author sustains that the realization of human rights, in relation to the right to an adequate 
standard of living, clearly requires the eradication of poverty.181 
 
The ICESCR is the international instrument which presents the most comprehensive, and 
according to the CESCR, the most important provision related to the right to an adequate 
standard of living.182 Article 11 of the ICESCR prescribes in its first paragraph that states shall 
recognize everyone’s right “to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, 
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living 
conditions”.183 Also, the right to be free from hunger is recognized in the second paragraph: 
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The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from 
hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-operation, the measures, including specific 
programmes, which are needed: 
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of 
technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by 
developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development 
and utilization of natural resources; 
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure an 
equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need.184 
 
There are other international instruments which also prescribe the right to an adequate standard 
of living. The article 25 of the UDHR, for example, clarifies that the standard of living shall be 
adequate for the health and well-being of a person and his or her family, including food, 
housing, medical care and necessary social services.185 The CRC prescribes that the standard 
of living shall be “adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social 
development”.186 
 
Eide sustains that although the basic components of the right to an adequate standard of living 
is prescribed in international instruments (food, housing, and clothing) a more precise 
definition of “adequate standard of living” is not developed by those.187 In order to better clarify 
the scope of this right and its basic components, the CESCR have adopted four General 
Comments related to the article 11 of the ICESCR. Those are General Comment No 4 related 
to adequate housing, General Comment No 7 also related to housing but addressing forced 
evictions specifically, General Comment No 12 related to the right to adequate food and finally 
the General Comment No 15 related to the right to water. 
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4.2.2. The Right to Adequate Housing 
 
Lack of adequate shelter may affect many social groups, however, homelessness is mostly 
faced by the extremely poor. Being homeless is, as sustained by Paraschiv, the most extreme 
manifestation of poverty in urban areas.188 There is no consensus on the definition of 
homelessness, which is problematic to provide an accurate comparisons among nations. 
Nevertheless, it is estimated that not less than 150 million people are homeless and 1.6 billion 
people lack adequate housing worldwide.189 Moreover, as observed by UNICEF, for the most 
poor, the right to adequate housing has an impact even on the right to life.190 
 
The most basic necessity related to adequate housing is shelter. The CESCR provides a broad 
definition of shelter in General Comment 4. Shelter is not merely having a roof and should not 
be understood as just a commodity. Adequate housing shall include the right to live in security, 
peace and dignity. The right to housing is connected to other human rights and the principle 
dignity, a premise of the Covenant. The CESCR, based on the Commission on Human 
Settlements and the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000, enumerates the basic 
necessities related to adequate shelter: “adequate privacy, adequate space, adequate security, 
adequate lighting and ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure and adequate location with 
regard to work and basic facilities”.191  
 
Also, it is recognized that adequacy can be partially determined by social, cultural and 
environmental factors. However, certain international standards shall be fulfilled in relation to 
right to adequate housing. Those are: 
 
 (i) Legal security of tenure: all forms of tenure (rental, lease and owner-occupation) shall have 
a degree of security to guarantee legal protection (against forced evictions or harassment, for 
example).  
(ii) Availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure which are essential to health, 
security, nutrition and comfort. This provision includes the access to safe drinking water, 
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energy for cooking, heating and lighting and among others, access to sanitation and means of 
food storage. 
(iii) Affordability: the cost of housing should not compromise or threat the satisfaction of other 
basic needs. This provision includes the state’s obligation to provide subsidies for those who 
are unable to afford housing. 
(iv) Habitability: to guarantee environmental and physical protection and an adequate space. 
(v) Accessibility: providing adequate resources and giving priority to disadvantaged groups 
with special needs such as the elderly, children, disable and victims of natural disaster. 
 (vi) Location: related to the access to services, such as schools, health care centers,  childcare 
and social facilities and employment options. It is noticed in this provision that financial costs 
of locomotion affect disproportionately poor households. The location shall also be safe and 
not threat the health of the habitants. 
(vii) Cultural adequacy: in the construction of the houses.192 
 
Following the principle of  legal security of tenure, General Comment 4 sustains that forced 
eviction are, prima facie, incompatible with the provisions of the ICESCR and should be only 
sustained in exceptional circumstances and in accordance with the principles of international 
law.193 
 
The CESCR elaborates more deeply the issue of forced evictions in the General Comment 7, 
clarifying which evictions are legal and what protections are required in the light of the 
ICESCR, which prescribes in its article 17.1 the right not to be forcefully evicted without 
adequate protection.194 Forced evictions are understood as permanent or temporary removal of 
individuals, families or communities from the homes they occupy. The removals are against 
their will and without the provision or access to appropriate form of legal or other forms of 
protection. The prohibition of forced evictions do not apply for those evictions carried in 
accordance with the law and in conformity with international human right law and the 
principles of reasonableness and proportionality.195 In other words, there are circumstances 
where evictions may be justifiable, such as the persistent non-payment of rent or damaging a 
rented property without reasonable cause. However, states shall ensure that evictions are 
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carried out in a manner warranted by law, guaranteeing appropriate procedural protection, due 
process, and that all legal resources and remedies are available for the people affected by those 
evictions.196  
 
States shall ensure that all feasible alternatives are explored in consultation with the affected 
people before carrying out any eviction, especially in circumstances involving large groups. 
This action is especially important in order to avoid or minimize the need of use of force.197 
Other procedural protections include: (i) adequate and reasonable notice prior to the scheduled 
eviction date, (ii) information regarding the eviction in reasonable time and (iii) provision of 
legal remedies for those affected by the eviction.198 
 
Although General Comment 4 do not explicitly list the minimum core obligations in relation 
to the right to adequate housing, it says that there are certain steps that must be taken 
immediately, regardless of the stage of development of states. Those are: (i) to respect negative 
obligations, meaning the state should abstain from certain practises that could threat the 
enjoyment of the right to adequate housing, (ii) to facilitate ‘self-help’ by affected groups, (iii) 
to monitor the housing situation of: homeless people, the inadequately housed without access 
to basic amenities, people living in ‘illegal’ settlements, people subjected to forced evictions 
and low income groups (iv) to request appropriate international cooperation if those steps are 
beyond their available resources.199 
 
In the same way, General Comment 7 sustains that the progressive fulfilment of rights based 
in the availability of resources is rarely relevant for forced eviction, once it is mostly related to 
a negative obligation. It sustains that states must refrain from forced evictions and ensure that 
a third party also do not engage in this practise.200 Moreover, it is valid to highlight that General 
Comment No 3 clarifies that when a State have a significant number of people living, among 
other things, without basic shelter, it shall be considered that this state is violating its 
obligations regarding the minimum core.201  
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In connection to extreme poverty, the CESCR highlights that the right to housing shall be 
ensured to everybody, regardless their income or access to economic resources and that priority 
must be given for those social groups living in unfavourable conditions. According to this 
provision States should focus on the most vulnerable, including the extremely poor.202 The 
CESCR also recognizes that vulnerable individuals and groups suffer disproportionately from 
forced evictions.203 Moreover, it highlights that evictions should not result in homelessness or 
leave people vulnerable to violations of other human rights. If an affected group or an 
individual are unable to provide housing for themselves, the state must take all appropriate 
measures to ensure an adequate alternative housing to the maximum of its available 
resources.204 
 
Litigation on both national and international level has addressed the right to adequate housing 
in claims brought by the extremely poor. In those cases, the Courts can effectively provide 
remedies to the extremely poor, including guaranteeing the protection of those who are affected 
by forced eviction, as will be observed in the following cases. 
 
On national level, as already mentioned in the previous section, in Ibrahim Sango Osman v 
Minister of State for Provincial Administration & Internal Security the Kenyan High Court 
found a violation in the right to adequate housing when accessing the extremely poor conditions 
of more than 1.000 people who were forcedly evicted. In conformity with the CESCR 
prescriptions, the Court held that eviction shall not result in an individual becoming homeless 
or vulnerable to other human rights violations.205 
 
The case Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others in 
South Africa was related to the eviction of a community of an informal settlement on private 
land. The community had set up minimal shelter made of plastic where people lacked access 
to sanitation and electricity. The community did not challenge the eviction but the lack of 
temporary accommodation. South African Constitutional Court held that the state has the 
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obligation to take positive actions to meet the need of people living in extreme poverty, 
especially homeless people and those living in intolerable conditions. The Court also held that 
adequate basic temporary shelter shall be given to the petitioners. Although the South African 
Constitutional Court refused to establish the minimum core obligations of the state on this 
occasion, it held that the right of children to shelter cannot be subjected to the available 
resources. It held that by failing to provide for those who were most in need, the state had failed 
to take the reasonable measures towards the progressively realization of the right to housing. 
The Court ordered the state to implement and supervise measures to provide relief for those in 
most desperate needs.206  
   
Another relevant case for the protection of the poor in South Africa was Jaftha v.Schoeman 
and Van Rooyen v. Stoltz. They were two similar cases related to the right to adequate housing. 
Maggie Jaftha was a poor, unemployed and sick woman who had only two years of formal 
education and had two children. She had borrowed 27 US dollars and fell behind in the payment 
after being charged a significant interest over it. This led to the sale execution of her house, 
which she got by state housing subsidy, once she failed to appear before Court due to a 
hospitalization for treating her heart problems. Van Rooyen was a mother of three who was 
also unemployed, poor and had never the chance to go to school. Her debt was around 35 US 
dollars and she also lost her house. The Court acknowledged that if the applicants would lose 
their house they would not be able to obtain another subsidy from the state and would be left 
without any alternative accommodation. It recognized the negative obligation of states to not 
interfere unjustifiably with any person’s existing right to housing. The Court ordered that those 
sales could only be ordered with judicial oversight and stressed that some factors should be 
taken in consideration in those cases, such as the amount of the debt, the attempt to pay them 
and their vulnerable financial situation.207 
 
At the international level, the Endorois case became famous for being the first case in which 
the African Commission recognized the right to development. In the 1970s the Kenyan 
government evicted the Endorois community from their ancestral land in order to create a 
tourist game reserve.208 The Commission held that Kenya had a higher duty in terms of taking 
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positive steps in protecting groups and vulnerable communities like the Endorois. Those steps 
should include “the creation of opportunities, policies, institutions, or other mechanisms that 
allow for different cultures and ways of life to exist. The Commission held that those measures 
shall be developed considering the challenges faced by indigenous communities. These 
challenges include: exclusion, exploitation, discrimination and extreme poverty”.209 The main 
focus of the case was the violation of property and forced eviction, but the Commission also 
found a violation of the rights to religious practice, to culture, to the free disposition of natural 
resources, and for the first time, to the right to development. The African Commission 
acknowledged that one of the key characteristic of indigenous groups is that their survival 
depends on their access to their traditional land and their natural resources.210 
 
Moreover, the jurisprudence has also engaged in the defining of the minimum core content to 
the right to housing. In the Serac case211, the first case where the African Commission outlined 
economic and social obligations of States in great detail.212 The Commission made 
considerations regarding the obligation of states to respect and protect the right to adequate 
housing. The Commission stated that, at a very minimum, the right to shelter obliges the states 
not to destroy houses of its citizens, not to obstruct their effort to rebuild lost homes and the 
obligation to prevent a violation when it is committed by other individual or non-state actors. 
The Commission concluded that Nigerian government had failed to fulfil those three minimum 
obligations.213  
4.2.3. The Right to Food 
 
To the CESCR, poverty is the main drive to violations related to the right to food. Malnutrition 
and undernutrition are problems concerning developing countries. In the words of the 
Committee: “the roots of the problem of hunger and malnutrition are not lack of food but lack 
of access to available food, inter alia because of poverty, by large segments of the world’s 
population”.214 According to the newest hunger map of the Word Food Programme, released 
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in August of 2019, still 821 million people do not have enough to eat.215 The number presented 
in 1999, the year that the General Comment was published, was about 840 million.216 
 
As previously argued, violation of the right to food, specifically of its minimum core, leads to 
violation of the right to life. Hunger can lead people to die from starvation. Malnutrition affects 
the ability of people to enjoy other rights, it can compromise the cognitive development of 
children, lead children to stunting (a marker of poverty) and reduce productiveness in adults.217 
 
The CESCR clarifies that the right to adequate food would be realized when every person, 
alone or in community, would have, at all times, physical and economic access to adequate 
food or the means to its procurement. 218  
 
The core content of the right includes the availability of food in accordance to the dietary needs 
of people, both in quality and quantity, to guarantee the nutrients needed to physical and mental 
development and maintenance. Food shall also be free from adverse substances and culturally 
accepted. Also, the accessibility of food shall be sustainable and it shall not interfere with the 
enjoyment of other human rights.219 
 
Accessibility embraces economic and physical accessibility. Both can be linked to extreme 
poverty. The CESCR clarifies that economic accessibility implies that the acquisition of food 
for an adequate diet shall not comprise the satisfaction of other basic needs and that socially 
vulnerable people, especially the landless and the poor, may need special attention. Physical 
accessibility requires that adequate food shall be accessible to all. Special attention and even 
priority shall be given to disadvantaged groups, which include the extremely poor. Moreover, 
the Committee highlights that many indigenous populations are in a particular vulnerable 
situation when their access to their ancestral land, which they depend on, may be threatened.220 
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Although it can be realized progressively, the article 11 (2) of the Covenant sustains that states 
specifically recognize the fundamental right to be free from hunger. States shall take a more 
immediate and urgent step in that direction. In that sense, the obligation to act for the mitigation 
and alleviation of hunger is considered to be the core obligation related to the right to adequate 
food. States have, therefore, the obligation to ensure that everyone in their jurisdiction has 
access to the minimum essential food. In order to ensure their freedom from hunger, the food 
shall be sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe. A violation of the ICESCR occurs when 
these essential levels required to be free from hunger are not ensured.221 
 
States also have the obligation to respect existing access to adequate food and not to take any 
measures to threat such access. States shall also protect people from action of third parties 
which could compromise their access to adequate food. Regarding the obligation to fulfil, states 
have the obligation to facilitate (through positive actions) and provide food directly when the 
individuals are not able to enjoy this right due to reasons beyond their control.222  
 
The CESCR also sustains that the right to adequate food is connected to the principle of human 
dignity, a precondition for the fulfilment of other basic human rights and it is inseparable from 
social justice. It is also argued that the realization of this right requires the adoption of 
appropriate measures, both on national and international levels, “oriented to the eradication of 
poverty and the fulfilment of all human rights for all”.223 
 
The right to adequate food has been analysed by national and regional courts. The next part of 
this subsection focus especially on the right to be free from hunger, a core obligation related 
deeply to extreme poverty. 
 
In the first case brought to the Indian Supreme Court regarding the right to food was Kishen 
Pattnayak & another v. State of Orissa (1989). The case was concerning the situation of 
extremely poor people in Kalahandi/Orissa, where hundreds were dying of starvation, 
especially children. It is mentioned, that in order to save themselves for starvation, people had 
subjected themselves to “distress sale of labour on a large scale resulting in exploitation of 
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landless labourers by the well to-do landlords”.224 The Court recognized that most of the people 
in the region were living below the poverty line and gave directions regarding necessary 
measures to prevent death by starvation, for example, by establishing a Committee to look after 
the welfare of the people of the region. However, the Court failed to give specific remedies to 
the situation.225 
  
A development in the way to address and provide judicial remedies regarding the right to food 
in India was brought in People’s Union for civil liberties v Union of India & Ors, a case already 
mentioned in the previous section. Differently than Kishen Pattnayak & another v. State of 
Orissa, the Supreme Court of India did not accept that the state had taken appropriate measure 
to address the starvations deaths in the area. In the words of the Court: 
 
The Government programmes in the present drought grossly under-estimate the number of persons 
requiring immediate assistance, as well as the quantity of foodgrain needed immediately for distribution 
to the poor to stave off starvation. The efforts of the Government in fact amount to tokenism and represent 
a gross dereliction of duty and betrayal. Both Articles 14 and 21 are violated in that disregard for the 
drought-affected is harsh and discriminatory, affecting life itself. 226 
 
In this case, the Court argued that the right to life included not only the right to food but also 
the right to water, shelter, education, medical care and decent environment. As previous 
mentioned, it was ruled that people living in extreme poverty or those who do not have financial 
capacity to purchase food by themselves are entitled to states protection. The Court sustained 
that the state failed to prevent starvation and ordered a series of remedies to redress the 
situation.227  
 
In Colombia, the Court reviewed the policy in place for the protection of displaced people in 
T-602 of 2003, a case related to a displaced family composed by an old woman and her two 
children. The Court sustained that affirmative actions have to satisfy the basic necessities of 
the most vulnerable groups to guarantee the minimum for their survival. Referring to a previous 
decision, the Court sustained that the victim of extreme social conditions, such as extreme 
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poverty, have to be covered by exception protection mechanisms once their survival capacity 
are threated. In other words, it argued that extreme poverty (or misery, in literal translation) 
cannot be tolerated once it compromised the vital minimum. Extremely poor people shall also 
be included in permanent programs and projects as long as their vulnerability remain. The 
Court also stated that the state have to offer the indispensable conditions to secure that all 
inhabitants could live a life in dignity. It highlighted that the government is required to promote 
the capabilities of people and to act efficiently to increase the welfare of people, considering 
the rights to food, living, and social security. 228   
 
Basing its decision on international human rights treaties, the Court considered that economic 
accessibility and economic support were essential in helping people to escape from poverty 
and ordered the implementation of a food program focusing on displaced children. The Court 
also held that the petitioners were to be included in a food security plan within six months. In 
this case, the Court defined the right to food as part of the right to an adequate standard of 
living and found that the system of protection of displaced people at that time was not 
sufficient. This is an useful example of how the Court can change policies and expand its 
findings to protect other vulnerable people which are not connected to a specific case. 229  
   
In 2007, an Argentinian Human Rights Ombudsman asked the Supreme Court to adopt urgent 
measures to improve the living condition of the Toba, an indigenous community which was 
living in extreme poverty without access to food, housing, safe drinking water, the necessary 
medical assistance and education. At that time, eleven deaths were attributed by the lack of 
food and health assistance. The Ombudsman stated that the national government is obliged to 
ensure that the basic rights for all citizens are met, which means fulfilling the basic needs of 
the population, including realizing the rights to life and health. Considering the extreme degree 
of misery, the Ombudsman also argued that, undoubtedly, the state has not complied with its 
obligations towards the habitants of the Toba community. The Supreme Court granted 
precautionary measures regarding the immediate provision of not only food but also safe water 
and transportation for the sick to access public health care centres. Additionally, the Court 
requested the state to submit information regarding, among others, the resources allocated to 
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the Toba community and the implementation of programs related to food, housing, water, 
health care and education. 230 
 
Another domestic case connected to the right to food and adequate standard of living addressed 
the situation of an extreme poor group living in Maceio, capital of Alagoas state in Brazil. The 
case sparked due to the deplorable living conditions that affected the community of almost two 
thousand people living in four neighbour favelas (Mundaú, Sururu de Capote, Torre and 
Muvuca). Among other things, the State Public Ministry highlighted that the community could 
not satisfy their basic need for food. Children faced malnutrition and severe malnutrition and 
the community lacked basic infrastructure and sanitation with no regular access to water or 
electricity. Also, their houses were made of plastic and cardboard. Children were also 
vulnerable to child labour, including sexual exploitation. The existing social benefits (social 
security) and medical programs had a limited coverage in the area once many members of the 
community even lacked necessary basic documents to eligibility. Based on constitutional and 
international provisions, the municipality was found responsible for the violations of the rights 
to food, health and education of the children in the area. Among other things, the municipality 
was required to offer a plan to expand and create shelters to assist children and adolescents on 
emergency situations, to offer day care and access to school to all the children in the community 
and to promote campaigns to issue birth certificates and against child labour.231  
 
The already mentioned Serac case, is also an example of how the right to food have been 
understood at regional level. The communication alleged that a state-owned company 
(Nigerian Petroleum Company and Shell Petroleum Development Corporation) had committed 
a range of human rights violations in which the State could be held responsible. The companies 
had explored the area without considering the health and environmental impacts for the local 
population. As a result, the water, soil and air were polluted, causing long-term health problems 
for the people in the area. Furthermore, several military operations took place in the area against 
the Ogoni people, who were protesting against the oil companies. Several villages were burned 
and destroyed. Farm animals and even some people were killed. The petitioner alleged that the 
destruction of the farms, rivers, crops and animals led certain Ogoni communities to 
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malnutrition and starvation, a characteristic of extreme poverty.232 The African Commission 
held that the Nigerian government had violated several of the human rights norms, including 
the right to life, to health, to property, to economic, social and cultural development and the 
right to food, implicitly contained in the right to life, as already mentioned. The Court made 
considerations regarding the minimum of the state’s obligation to respect and protect regarding 
the right to food, saying that the minimum core of this right includes that the State should not 
destroy or contaminate the sources of food or let any private party to do so.233 
4.2.4. The Right to Water 
 
In 2000 it was estimated that 1.1 billion people did not have access to water supply and 2.7 
billion people did not have access to adequate sanitation. Although the number have decrease 
in the last decades, still in 2017, there were 785 million people living without drinking water 
services and 2 billion without access to sanitation.234 As sustained by Angoua et. al., extremely 
poor people are the most affected by the lack of access to water and sanitation due their 
vulnerable and marginalized conditions. It includes slum dwellers living in precarious 
conditions in urban areas, disadvantaged urban community livings in fringes and people living 
in deprived rural areas. The problem also affects the developing world disproportionately. In 
2014, the percentage of people in sub-Saharan Africa living in slums was 55%. In 2015, 70% 
of the population in the same area did not have access to proper sanitation and 32% were relying 
on improper sources of drinking water.235 
 
The last General Comment related to the adequate standard of living addresses the right to 
water. The CESCR argues that although not explicitly included in the article 11 of the ICESCR, 
the right to water clearly falls within that provision once water is essential for securing an 
adequate standard of living and one of the most fundamental capabilities for survival.236 
Additionally, the right to water supplies appears on the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women as a necessity related to adequate living conditions.237 
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The CESCR also connects the right to water to the right to the highest attainable standards of 
health.238 The Convention on the Rights of the Child requires states to tackle diseases and 
malnutrition “through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking water”.239 
 
The right to water entitles all individuals to “sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible 
and affordable water for personal and domestic uses”.240 The water shall be safe and enough to 
prevent death from dehydration. It shall also be provided for cooking, personal and domestic 
hygiene requirements. The right to water includes negative and positive obligations. People 
have the right to maintain access for existing supplies, the right to be free from interference 
and to be free from arbitrary disconnection and contamination of water supplies. People have 
also the right to a system of water supply and management.241 
 
The Committee recognises that although the adequacy of water required can vary according to 
different conditions, three factors shall apply to all: (i) availability: states can resort to the 
guidelines to the World Health Organization (WHO) to establish the quantity of water needed 
per person; (ii) quality: related to the safety of the water and (iii) accessibility: including 
physical and economic accessibility provided without discrimination. Water services and 
facilities shall be accessible to all, including the most vulnerable and marginalized ones. In this 
context, economic accessibility means that water facilities and services must be affordable for 
all and the cost and charges related to these services shall not compromise or threat the 
realization of other human rights.242 
 
The obligations of the state include (i) the obligation to respect, meaning the obligation not to 
interfere directly or indirectly in the enjoyment to the right to water, including limiting equal 
access to adequate water, (ii) the obligation to protect the people against interferences in the 
enjoyment of the right to water by third parties. When water services are provided by third 
parties the state must guarantee that they provide equal, affordable and sufficient, safe and 
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acceptable water and (iii) the obligation to fulfil, meaning to provide the right whenever people 
are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realize the right to water by themselves.243 
 
The core obligations regarding water includes (i) to ensure access to the minimum essential 
amount of water for personal and domestic use to prevent diseases, (ii) to ensure non-
discriminatory access to water and water facilities, especially for disadvantaged or 
marginalized groups, such as the extremely poor (iii) to ensure physical access to water 
avoiding prohibitive waiting time and at a reasonable distance, (iv) to ensure personal security 
of people when having physical access to water, (v) to ensure equitable distribution, (vi) to 
adopt a national water strategy to address all its population, (vii) to monitor the realization of 
the right, (viii), to adopt low cost program targeting vulnerable and marginalized groups and 
finally (ix) to prevent, treat and control diseases linked to water, in particular ensuring access 
to adequate sanitation.244 Additionally, states have the obligation to progressively extent 
sanitation services, especially in rural areas and deprived urban areas.245 
 
Regarding the allocation of water, priority must be given for personal, domestic use 
guaranteeing that the water resources required to prevent starvation and diseases, are satisfied. 
The CESCR also notes that water is an important resource for agriculture, which connects the 
right to water to the realization of the right to adequate food. It is stressed that states shall give 
special attention to disadvantaged and marginalized farmers and to indigenous people, once 
access to water is essential in maintaining their livelihoods.246 
 
The Committee recognizes that contamination of the water, as well as its exploration and 
unequal distribution exacerbates by poverty. For this reasons, priority shall be given to the 
water resources needed to prevent starvation, diseases and to meet the core obligations of other 
rights.247 Moreover, as already mentioned, states have obligations towards the extremely poor, 
such as the obligation to provide access to water for those who do not have sufficient means, 
giving special attention to individuals and groups who traditionally face difficulties in 
exercising the right to water.248 
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The right to water has already appeared in some cases discussed in the section. Access to water 
and sanitation were key components in the Grootboom case249, Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE) v. Sudan250 and in Ibrahim Sango Osman v Minister of State for Provincial 
Administration & Internal Security251 in connection with the right to adequate housing. Also, 
in connection with the right to food in the Toba case252, the Argentine Supreme Court issued 
precautionary measures guaranteeing the provision of water and ordered the state to implement 
a program in the community to ensure potable water.  
 
Moreover, one case in Argentina shows that Courts can guarantee the right to water to those 
living in extreme poverty.  In Quevedo, Miguel Ángel y Otros c/Aguas Cordobesas SA, a private 
company responsible for water provision, disconnected the water supply of Miguel Ángel 
Quevedo and other low-income families due to lack of payment. The families lived in 
extremely poor conditions, facing vulnerable socioeconomic conditions and unemployment. 
The Court held that the right to drinking water is guaranteed by national and international law 
and its violation compromises the health and the physical integrity of individuals. It highlighted 
that the absence of drinking water has several implications, especially for those living in 
poverty. As mentioned in this section, the core obligations related to the right to water includes 
ensuring a minimum access to an essential amount of water. The Court held that the company 
would have to provide a minimum daily supply for each family and increase the minimum 
supply from 50 litres (as established in the country’s Regulatory Framework) to 200 litres per 
household once it considered that 50 litres of water would not be enough to guarantee basic 
hygiene and health conditions to an average family. This is an example of a case where the 
national court successfully established the content of a minimum obligation for the State. 253 
 
Although the previous cases are presented in this section due to the important role of the 
violation of the right to adequate standards of living (including housing, food and water) plays 
in those judgements, they are clear examples of the multidimensional deprivations that 
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extremely poor people face, once there are violations of other rights which have a constitutive 
relevance to poverty, such as health and education. It is also a good example of the 
indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights. 
  
Moreover, some cases presented in this section show how poverty can also be the cause to other 
human rights violations, not only those which have a constitutive relevance to poverty but also 
those related to other civil and political human rights. The Kishen Pattnayak & another v. State 
of Orissa shows that extremely poor people are willing to accept exploited labour conditions 
in order not to die from starvation.254 In Maceio, extreme poverty also lead children to work, 
including sexual work.255  
 
The Inter-American Court has already recognized this connection between extreme poverty 
and the violation of civil right related to forced labour and slavery. As the Case of the workers 
of the Brazil Verde Estate against Brazil, related to forced labour and slavery, the Court 
acknowledged that all the victims shared a common background: being poor. The Court 
emphasized that the victims came from the poorest regions of Brazil with the fewest work 
opportunities and the lowest level of human development. They were illiterate and placed in a 
situation in which they were more prone to be recruited via false promises. As a result, the 
Court sustained: 
 
It appears from the evidence in the case file that there was a situation based on the economic status of 
 the victims (...) that amounted to discriminatory treatment. According to several reports by the ILO and 
 the Brazilian Ministry of Labor, “it is the extreme poverty of the worker that leads him spontaneously to 
 accept the labor conditions offered,” particularly since “the more living conditions deteriorate, the greater 
 the willingness of workers to face the risks of working far from home. In that sense, poverty is the main 
 factor driving contemporary slavery in Brazil, because it increases the vulnerability of a significant 
 segment of the population, making them easy prey for slave labor recruiters.256 
4.3. The Right to Health 
 
The CESCR recognizes that the fulfilment of the provisions included in the right to health are 
still a distant goal, especially by those living in poverty.257 The right to health is also connected 
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to extreme poverty through a freedom mostly related to people’s survival, freedom to lead 
normal spans of life (see Table 1). Violations on the right to enjoy the highest attainable 
standards of health affects the extremely poor disproportionately. As sustained by Singh and 
Singh, people in developing societies fight mostly against infectious and communicable 
diseases while in the developed world the diseases are mostly related to lifestyle. The authors 
argue that there are also primary diseases related to poverty, such as tuberculosis, malaria and 
malnutrition.258 The denial of a minimum content of the right to health compromises the ability 
of people to survive. As previous mentioned, according to UNICEF, extremely poor children 
are twice as likely to die before completing five years and to be chronically malnourished than 
children from other social classes. In 2015, about 5.9 million children died before turning 5 
years-old and in a projection, UNICEF estimated that by 2030, 69 million children will die 
before completing five years due to preventable diseases or causes. Poor women are also less 
likely to have access to prenatal care and skilled birth than the richer women. Also, women 
from socially vulnerable groups, often experience hostile treatment or lack of responsiveness 
from health care providers. Even in cases when health care services are accessible and 
affordable, poor women can suffer from discriminatory practices.259 
  
The ICESCR prescribes the elements necessary to live a healthy life and the entitlement 
necessary to give significance to the right. Article 12 states that the right for everyone to enjoy 
the highest attainable standards of health shall be recognized by all States Parties and that steps 
have to be taken in order to achieve the full realization of the rights, including the following 
necessary provisions: (i) to reduce stillborn and infant mortality rates related to the health 
development of the child, (ii) to improve aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene, (iii) 
to prevent, treat and control, among others, epidemic, endemic and occupational diseases and 
(iv), to create conditions for ensuring medical service in the event of sickness.260 
 
As sustained by the CESCR, the right to health cannot be understood as the right to be healthy 
since being healthy cannot be addressed solely by states. It also depends on several variables 
such as genetic conditions, lifestyle and individual susceptibility. In that sense, the right to 
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health shall be understood “as the right to enjoyment of a variety of facilities, goods, services 
and conditions necessary for the realization of the highest attainable standard of health”.261 
 
There are four essential elements of the right to health, whose application would depend on the 
socioeconomic conditions of each State Party. The first is availability, meaning that public 
health care facilities, goods, services and programmes shall be available in sufficient quantity. 
Also, underlying determinants of health shall be available, such as safe and potable water, 
sanitation facilities, hospitals, health centres and essential drugs. The second element is 
accessibility. Health facilities, goods and services shall be accessible to the whole population 
without discrimination. That embraces information accessibility, physical accessibility and 
economic accessibility. Physical accessibility means that facilities and services shall be within 
safe physical reach for all the population, and especially for the most vulnerable and 
marginalized groups, which can include the extremely poor. Moreover, economic accessibility 
is related to affordability, meaning that all health services and goods shall be affordable to all, 
including the extremely poor. By the principle of equity, the poorest households should not be 
disproportionately burdened of expenses related to health in comparison to the richest 
households. The third element related to the right to health is acceptability, regarding respectful 
medical ethics which takes into consideration cultural dimensions. The last element is quality, 
meaning that the services and goods must be medically appropriate and in good quality.262 
 
As any other right, states have the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil towards the right to 
health. More specifically, the obligation to respect would include, for example, to refrain from 
denying equal access to all the population or abstain from unlawfully polluting the air, water 
and soil. The obligation to protect includes, for example, to control health care related services 
provided by third parties and to guarantee that those services are in conformity with the 
essential elements of the right to health when those services are privatized. The obligation to 
fulfil includes taking positive measures to enable all individuals to enjoy the right to health and 
to directly provide for those who are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right 
to health by themselves.263  
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The core content of the right to health includes especially essential primary health care and (i) 
the right to access health facilities and services on a non-discriminatory basis and especially 
for the most vulnerable and marginalized groups, including the extremely poor, (ii) the right to 
access minimum essential food to ensure the freedom from hunger, a direct connection to the 
right to food, (iii) the right to ensure access to basic shelter, housing, sanitation and safe water, 
another straightforward connection to the right to adequate standards of living, (iv) the right to 
access to essential drugs, defined by the WHO Programme on essential drugs, (v) the right to 
equitable distribution of all health services and (vi) the implementation of public health 
strategies.264 
 
Furthermore, the Committee establishes that there are obligations that are comparable in 
priority to those established minimum core contents. Those are (i) to ensure reproductive, 
maternal and child health, (ii) to provide information regarding major infectious diseases, (iii) 
to provide measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases, (iv) to provide 
education and accessible information regarding birth control and main problems in the 
community and finally, (v) to provide adequate training for the health personnel.265 
 
Extremely poor people have also been seeking remedies to their situation through the right to 
health. The right to health is also indispensable for the exercise of other human rights, including 
other core rights such as the right to food, housing and access to water, since these are 
determinants of health. In other words, the right to health embraces many socio-economic 
factors since they promote the conditions in which people can enjoy a healthy life.  Also, the 
enjoyment of the right to health is a conductive to live a life in dignity.266 For that reason, the 
right to health have already appeared in the last two sections in connection to the right to an 
adequate standard of living and the right to life. To exemplify, the right to health was an 
important component in the cases related to the right to food. In Argentina, the Court have 
ordered the implementation of a health care program to the Toba community, since deaths were 
attributed to lack of food and health care assistance.267 At the international level, the Serac case 
also dealt with the right to health since the contamination of the soil led to long-term health 
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problems in the Ogoni community in Nigeria. 268 Considering the connections with the right to 
life, the right to health was evaluated in the Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa v. 
Paraguay269 and in Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay270 when 
establishing the violation of the right to life. 
 
There are also national and regional cases which are mostly connected to the right to health. 
Recently, several decision in India have found a constitutional right to maternal health in 
connection to the right to life. As stated before, maternal care is an obligation comparable in 
priority to those established in the core obligations. One example is Premlata w/o Ram Sagar 
& Ors. v. Govt. of NCT Delhi a case regarding six pregnant/lactating women living in a slum 
and facing poverty. They were denied food rations and access to prenatal and children care, 
including several national programmes which they were entitled to. The High Court of Delhi 
reaffirmed that the violation of the right to health derived from the right to life and made the 
same consideration about their right to food. 271 
 
In the Azanca Alheli Meza Garcia case, in Peru, the Constitutional Tribunal considered the 
importance of the right to health to guarantee the full enjoyment of the right to life. The Court 
was favourable to the applicants request for the provision of HIV-AIDS full treatment stating 
that the State shall comply with its obligation within reasonable time since this condition is 
indispensable for realizing the right to health progressively. 272 In words of the Tribunal:  
 
The Tribunal concludes granting legal protection to a social right, as is the right to health, because, in 
this case in particular, the conditions so merit. This judgment in favor of the appellant is founded not 
only on the potential violation of the right to life, but for reasons based on the legislation of the matters 
subject to this review for the maximum protection of HIV/AIDS patients, through the promulgation of 
Law N.° 28243, that modifies Law N.° 26626; moreover, when currently a campaign of antiretroviral 
treatment free of charge has been promoted for patients in conditions of extreme poverty, a group to 
which the appellant belongs, as she has in her favor an injunction issued by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Right.273 
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As a result of this case, the tribunal asked the Minister of health not only to offer the access to 
HIV-AIDS’s medication for the applicant but also to advance in the implementation of 
legislation that gives priority budget resources for people with HIV-AIDS living in extreme 
poverty. The Tribunal sustained that in line with the principles of justice and equality in a 
democratic state, it is necessary to guarantee the satisfaction of people’s basic necessities giving 
priority for those who cannot afford to satisfy their basic needs, therefore, a priority must be 
given for those who face extreme poverty.274 This is another successful example of how the 
Tribunal can recommend changes in policies and expand its findings to protect other poor 
people.  
 
In South Africa, the TAC case is also a good example of the protection of vulnerable and poor 
people which focused in the right to health. The Constitutional Court analysed the restriction 
of the policy adopted by the State in implementing a policy focusing in the prevention of AIDS’ 
mother-to-child transmission through breastfeeding and birth. The program used a medication 
named Nevirapine, but it was only available and accessible in two medical sites in each 
province, which meant that only 10% of the population would have access to it. As a result of 
this policy, only private clinics which focused on research were allowed to prescribe 
Nevirapine, not the public hospitals. Although the state argued that the limitation was 
reasonable due financial constraints, the Court found that those restrictions were too rigid. The 
Court highlighted that it is the duty of the State to help parents to access healthcare when they 
are not able to afford it and stressed that the justiciability of economic and social rights 
improves the life of poor people and vulnerable segments. Although the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa sustained, as in the previous mentioned Grootboom case, that it was impossible 
to guarantee universal access to core services immediately, it stressed that the State’s obligation 
towards the progressive realization of those rights and ordered that the medication shall be 
available in all the medical centres once it could save the lives of many. 275 
 
At the regional level, in Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia  the African Commission examined 
the mental health legal framework in the country. The claimant alleged that they had not given 
their consent for medical treatment and the conditions of the hospital were not ideal. 
Additionally the applicants were denied of their political right to vote. The Commission 
                                               
274 Ibid. para. 48. 
275 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) (CCT8/02) [2002] ZACC 15; 
2002 (5) SA 721; 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (5 July 2002). 
Catherine Silvério Guisso 
63 
 
acknowledged that the people in that psychiatric hospital were collected from the street, (where 
they were likely to be facing extreme poverty) and concluded that Gambia failed to satisfy the 
requirements to guarantee the right to enjoy the best attainable states of physical and mental 
health in conformity with article 16 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The 
Commission also held that, on the basis of the principle of non-discrimination and equal 
protection, Gambia should provide medical care services, material and medicines for all.  276 
 
The Commission acknowledged that the right to health should never be denied for people with 
mental illnesses once treatment is crucial to their survival and it also acknowledged that many 
countries at the African continent are facing poverty, which makes them incapable to provide 
the sufficient amenities and resources to facilitate the full enjoyment of rights. The Commission 
sustains that states are under the obligation to take concrete and target steps and full advantage 
of the resources available to ensure that the right to health is fully realized without 
discrimination of any kind.277 
 
In the Inter-American system, the Court recognized for the first time in 2018 the right to health 
as an autonomous right and enforceable in the case Poblete Vilches and others vs. Chile 
concerning the death of Mr. Vinicio Antonio Poblete Vilches. His low-income family claimed 
that the public hospital’s negligence have led to Mr. Vilches death and that the state failed to 
investigate the circumstances of his death. At the time, the Court found among other things a 
violation of the right to health, life and personal integrity.278 The Court acknowledged the 
Commission’s argument that this case offer the possibility to analyse particular situations of 
vulnerability regarding the right to health, specially taking in consideration the right of people 
who live in poverty.279  
 
Later in 2018, in a case related to poor people living with HIV, Cuscul Pivaral and Others vs. 
Guatemala, the Inter-American Court reaffirmed the right to health in connection with people 
living with HIV. The case was presented by 48 victims and their families, 15 of them had died 
while the case was under examination.280 They claimed that the anti-retroviral therapy was 
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inadequate. All the victims shared intersecting characteristic that put them in a more vulnerable 
position, including being poor. The Court highlighted that, in accordance to article 10 of the 
San Salvador Protocol the states shall guarantee the “satisfaction of the health needs of the 
highest risk groups and of those whose poverty makes them the most vulnerable”.281 Therefore, 
the Court recognized a special obligation of the states to respect and guarantee the right to 
health for those who live in vulnerable conditions, stating that people living in poverty often 
have an unequal access to health services and information which exposes them to a higher risk 
of infection and to receive inadequate medical services.282 The Court found Guatemala 
violating the right to health, to life, and to personal integrity, among others.  
4.4. The Right to Education 
 
Although the right to education is not related to a freedom directly connected to the ability of 
survival, this right is constitutive to extreme poverty because it can increase the possibility of 
a person to escape extreme poverty in many ways. In the words of the CESCR: 
 
Education is the primary vehicle by which economically and socially marginalized adults and children 
 can lift themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their communities. 
 Education has a vital role in empowering women, safeguarding children from exploitative and hazardous 
 labour and sexual exploitation, promoting human rights and democracy, protecting the environment, and 
 controlling population growth.283 
 
In the same way, UNICEF argues that without education, poor children are more likely to grow 
as low-skilled adults who will be poorly paid and susceptible to unsecure employment. 
Education is, therefore, a key right from breaking the intergenerational cycle of extreme 
poverty.284 Moreover, education enables the most poor to know about their entitlements and 
could potentially provide them the capacity to claim a violation of their rights.285  Education is 
also crucial for the fulfilment of other human rights, including political and civil rights,286 such 
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as freedom of information, expression, assembly, or the right of equal access to public service 
once they depend on a very minimum level of education and literacy.287 
 
According to UNICEF, 60% of the poorest population who are between 20 to 24 years old have 
less than four years of education. Also, as previously argued, children of mothers who have no 
access to educational services are three times more likely to die before completing five years 
than those whose mother attended to secondary education, which connects the right to 
education to the right to life, even if not in a straightforward way. In a prediction made for the 
year 2030, UNICEF sustain that 60 million children in primary school age will be out of school. 
Half of them will live in sub-Saharan Africa which will also account for 90% of the extremely 
poor children.288 
 
The ICESCR is the international instrument which sets the most comprehensive content of the 
right to education. Article 13 recognizes education as a universal right and sustains that it “shall 
be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity and 
shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”.289 Moreover 
education should “enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious 
groups”.290 
 
Primary education shall be compulsory and free of charge for everyone under the jurisdictions 
of the state, while secondary and higher education shall be made available and accessible. 
Those last two shall be offered on the basis of capacity, by all appropriate means, in particularly 
regarding progressively introduction as a free service. Furthermore, fundamental education 
shall be encouraged by those who did not receive it in the ideal time.291 
 
The CESCR clarifies that the right to receive education shall be firstly available. States shall 
have a sufficient number of education institutions providing educational services. In order to 
properly exercise its activities, educational institutions shall be protected from weather 
element, have adequate sanitation facilities, safe drinking water, trained teachers and, among 
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others, teaching materials. Secondly, the right to education shall be accessible to everyone, 
without discrimination, especially towards the most vulnerable groups, including the extremely 
poor. Accessibility includes physical accessibility and economic accessibility. Schools must be 
reasonably located in order to allow attendance or offer the possibility to distance learning 
programmes via internet. Education shall also be affordable to everyone and primary education 
shall be free to all. The third element is acceptability. Educational provisions shall be relevant, 
culturally appropriate and of good quality. The last element is adaptability. Education must be 
flexible to the changes in society and respond to the diversity needs and cultural setting of 
all.292 
 
States also have the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil towards the right to education. As 
previously mentioned, the obligation to respect require states to refrain from measures that 
prevent the enjoyment of the right such as not closing private schools. The obligation to protect 
is related to the adoption of measures to prevent that a third party would interfere in the right, 
for example, monitoring private schools. Finally, the obligation to fulfil is related to the 
provision of the right itself whenever individuals or groups cannot enjoy the right by 
themselves for reasons beyond their control. More specifically, although states have the 
principal responsibility for the provision of education in most circumstances, the obligation to 
fulfil are not the same at all the levels of education and priority shall be given for primary 
education, which shall be compulsory and free for all.293 
 
Moreover, as clarified by the CESCR: 
 
States parties are obliged to ensure that an educational fellowship system is in place to assist 
 disadvantaged groups. The obligation to pursue actively the “development of a system of schools at all 
 levels” reinforces the principal responsibility of States parties to ensure the direct provision of the right 
 to education in most circumstances. 294  
 
The minimum core content for the right to education is also established.  Those are (i) to 
provide access to public educational institutions on a non-discriminatory way, (ii) to provide 
primary education to all, (iii) to adopt national strategies in providing secondary, higher and 
                                               
292 CESCR, General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13 of the Covenant), 8 December 1999. UN. 
Doc. E/C.12/1999/10, para. 6. 
293 Ibid. para. 47-48. 
294 Ibid. para. 53. 
Catherine Silvério Guisso 
67 
 
fundamental education, and (iv) to ensure a free choice of education in conformity with the 
minimum educational standards, without interference from the State or third parties (vi) to 
ensure that education confirms the objectives of the article 13, previous mentioned in this 
section.295 
 
Still, 59 million children are denied access to primary school, of those, more than half lives in 
sub-Saharan Africa in 2013. Also children from the poorest households are, on their first day 
at school, unprepared to succeed in school and as they progress, they are more likely to drop 
out before completing primary school.296 In UNICEF’s words: 
 
The impact of poverty on education begins early, because the poorest children in any country are the 
 least likely to attend early childhood education programmes. And the disadvantages continue. In sub-
 Saharan Africa, nearly 60 percent of 20- to 24-year-olds from the poorest fifth of the population have 
 been through fewer than four years of schooling. By contrast, only 15 per cent in the richest quintile have 
 been in school for less than four years. In Egypt and the United Republic of Tanzania, being born poor 
 nearly doubles the risk of missing out on basic education relative to the national average. For poor women 
 in both countries, the risk is even higher.297 
  
Moreover, poverty also leaves children to develop learning deficits. Children of the poorest 
households are more likely to suffer from developmental delays in literacy and numeracy. 
Education can also be a tool to prevent the violation of other child rights, such as child 
labour.298 
 
The right to education appears in some of the previous cases discussed in the previous sections 
of this chapter, although the focus on those cases were more closely related to rights that could 
jeopardize the applicants survival. In the Toba case, for example, when members of the 
community have died because of lack of food and basic health care, education was included in 
the many deprivation the community was facing. The Court also requested the state to 
implement educational programs in the areas.299 The right to education was also violated in the 
Brazilian case involving four favela’s communities in Maceio. The Court held that all children 
in the community should be at school.300 
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More specifically, in 2015, the Inter-American Court considered poverty as one of the several 
factors that combined generated discrimination in the Case of Gonzales Lluy et al. v. Ecuador 
and recognized the right to education in connection to poverty. In the decision, there is a chapter 
which aim is only to analyse the situation of poverty faced by the Lluy family.301 The petitioner 
was a three years-old girl, Talía Gonzales Lluy, who faced severe discrimination from the 
teachers and school officials including being banned from attending her class. She faced 
discrimination for being HIV positive, a condition that she obtained after multiple blood 
transfusions where the blood was not tested for infectious diseases. Furthermore, her family 
was evicted and forced to move several times when landlords became aware of Talía’s 
condition. In the words of the Court:  
 
In this case, statements that have not been contested by the State illustrate the impact that the Lluy 
family’s situation of poverty had on the approach to Talía’s HIV (…). These statements have also 
explained the discrimination in the educational environment associated with how, in a prejudiced and 
stigmatizing way, Talía Gonzales Lluy was considered a risk for her classmates, not only when she was 
expelled from the Zoila Aurora Palacios School, but at other time when she tried to access the education 
system. 302  
 
The Court also sustained that “the situation of poverty also had an impact on the difficulties to 
gain access to the education system and to lead a decent life”. 303 The Court found that the case 
was a confluence of multiple intersecting vulnerabilities once the petitioner was a poor girl 
living with HIV and it emphasized that poverty had also an impact in the initial non access to 
adequate health care which lead to HIV transmission. Furthermore, the Court also found that 
poverty led to difficulties to gain access to adequate housing. Ecuador was found in violation 
of the rights to life, physical integrity and education.304  
4.5. The Importance of a Poverty Jurisprudence and Access to Justice  
 
The last sections have shown how courts have applied the human rights framework in cases 
claimed by the extreme poor. In these cases, poverty was considered an important factor to 
establish a violation of the right to life, to an adequate standard of living, to health and 
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education. At national and international levels, the jurisprudence supports that states can be 
found responsible for failures to adopt measures to facilitate and provide access to the minimum 
conditions that would enable people facing extreme poverty to maintain their survival and live 
a life in dignity. In this sense, extreme poverty have been handled as a condition where 
dignified existence is not possible and the vulnerable conditions of the extremely poor have 
been understood as a violation of the core content of  human rights.305 
 
The national and international cases exemplify the national and international court’s 
transformative capacity of changing the reality and providing effective remedies and standards 
for those who are struggling with the most inhuman deprivations. According to Formisano 
Prada:  
 
Judicial decisions have accordingly an emancipatory impact since they propose ways of relief to 
 marginalized people. Sometimes they even mark the beginning of social change. (...) Legal adjudication 
 breaks the cycle of misrecognition, and thus of subordination, and institutionalizes transformative 
 strategies to remedy their human condition to establish a life with dignity. Justiciability provides 
 standards to redistribute social goods such as non-discrimination, equality, access to rights and resources, 
 as well as minimum standards of legal protection. Justiciability therefore becomes a tool of 
 transformation and empowerment by altering structured inequalities in society and empowering social 
 relations. Justiciability balances socio-economic patterns by combating cultural, social, sexual and racial 
 discrimination.306 
 
Adjudication would, therefore, have the following positive consequences to the very poor: (i) 
gives visibility, (ii) gives voice, (iii) increases the accountability of duty bearers, (iv) protects 
and provides remedies for alleged violations, (iv) develops means of compensation, (vi) creates 
basis to policies and finally (vii) develops the legal framework.307 
 
Access to justice at national and international level is, therefore, fundamental for tackling the 
causes of poverty. The right to access to justice is not considered a constitutive right to poverty 
in this thesis once it is not directly connected to a basic freedom, however, access to justice is 
a key right to empower the poor. It gives the extreme poor the means to obtain redress for the 
violations of the right to life, adequate standards of living, health and education. The right to 
effective remedy is a crucial element to ensure the protection of human rights. However, 
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difficulties to access justice affect poor people disproportionately. The lack of effective 
remedies for violation in the rights which have a constitutive relevance to poverty are still a 
reality in many jurisdictions. Also, the inability of the extremely poor to pursue remedies 
through the existing judicial system increase their vulnerability to poverty which further 
hamper their ability to access the judicial systems. This vicious circle compromises the 
enjoyment of several human rights.308 
 
Legal procedures can play a key role in facilitating poor people to have access to justice. 
Standing rules have a considerable impact regarding the accessibility of legal complaints by 
individuals and groups. At the domestic level, some systems support that different categories 
of individuals and groups can claim a violation of a right, not only the person who suffer the 
violation. In South Africa, for example, anyone can act in their own interest or on behalf of 
those who cannot act in their own name. There is also the possibility to act as a member or in 
the interest of a group. Additionally, anyone can act in the public interest and an association 
can act in the interest of their members.309 On those states, the work of NGO can be crucial to 
promote the rights of the most vulnerable. 
 
In the same way, some systems guarantee the possibilities to bring collective claims, where all 
the victims can file a single claim together, on behalf of a large group or make a collective 
complain where the claimant is not required to be victim but a representative of the public 
interest.310 States’ restrictions on collective limitations represent an obstacle for bringing 
justice to people who live in extreme poverty, especially to bring remedies for structural or 
systemic abuses which affect a large number of people living under the same conditions.311 The 
collective nature of the constitutive rights in connection to poverty makes a decision regarding 
them to have practical consequences beyond interest of parties involved in the legal proceeding. 
In some jurisdictions, judgments establish precedent and can even propose measures to change 
the current legislation or policies. That was the case of Azanca Alheli Meza Garcia, when the 
Court required the implementation of legislation in order to give priority resources for people 
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with HIV-AIDS living in extreme poverty.312 Collective litigation mechanisms can ensure that 
rights would become meaningful for large groups and even for those who were not aware of 
their violation. There are many cases in the last sections that exemplifies the importance of 
collective claims, especially on those concerning indigenous communities which experiences 
extreme poverty such as Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay and the Case of 
the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. The findings of these cases had 
brought remedies to the whole community. 
 
However, in other systems, narrow standing rules are settled. Considering that people living in 
extreme poverty often lack of resources and capacity to initiate judicial procedures by 
themselves, narrow standing rules may represent an obstacle to poor people to bring claims.  In 
some domestic systems, for example in Switzerland, the Court can only establish individual 
remedies to the direct victims acting in their own interest.313 
 
In some areas, extremely poor people even lack legal identity. Formal registration is the first 
barrier in accessing the justice system. It also jeopardizes the access to other public services 
and the enjoyment of to political and civil rights.314 That feature can be exemplified with 
previous mentioned Brazilian case, where the residents of a favela in Maceio could not access 
the existing social benefits and medical programs because they lacked the necessary basic 
documents for eligibility.315 
 
As explained by Sepúlveda Carmona, in a report given as former special rapporteur on extreme 
poverty and human rights, people living in poverty are usually deprived of the opportunities to 
acquire the necessary tools (social capital tools and basic legal knowledge) to engage in the 
legal system. Extremely poor people are often unaware of the existence and content of their 
legal rights and do not know how to formalize their demands or to seek the assistance they 
need.316 In other words, people living in poverty are unaware that they have a right to adequate 
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housing, food, water, health and education and that they can claim redresses in courts if they 
believe they are suffering from a violation of these rights.317 
 
Additionally, fees and costs to legal assistance (when legal assistance exist), to obtain legal 
documents, to copy them, to get witness and experts, phone calls, among others, are all 
impediments that affect poor people disproportionately, making it difficult for them to access  
justice.318 The work of NGOs is also important in this context, since they can reduce financial 
and personal burden of legal action for poor people.319 
 
The level of simplicity or complexity of formal requirement (for example: formal write and 
legal representation) are also very important regarding access to justice. In order to facilitate 
and speed access, many Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, adopted 
protection procedures with simple formalities where any person may file a claim to prevent the 
State to make an unlawful act that violates their rights. These protection procedures are usually 
decided in a very short period of time. In Colombia, complaints can be filed without a lawyer. 
In Costa Rica the procedure is so simple and straightforward that cases have been brought by 
children who were challenging educational decisions of their schools.320 
 
Regarding these obstacles, which include social and cultural barriers and also institutional and 
structural issues, domestic system have been acting in the protection of the human rights of  
extremely vulnerable and marginalized groups by giving concrete remedies for the violation of 
their human rights and even impacting and strengthening the legal framework to promote the 
protection of the very poor. Litigation can, therefore, be pointed out as an important tool to 
tackle extreme poverty. When domestic avenues fail to give effective remedies, international 
protection mechanisms become important and they also have developed a jurisprudence 
regarding the protection of the very poor.   
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5. Conclusions 
 
Although extreme poverty has decreased during the last decades, tackling the issue is still an 
urgent matter since there are 735 million people who are unable to meet their basic needs to 
survive and still experience chronically undernutrition, famine, illiteracy and death from 
poverty-related and preventable diseases.321 Because of this, mitigation of extreme poverty is 
one of the most important human interests.  
 
Poverty is a multidimensional issue and many areas have to be involved in addressing this 
phenomenon at all its levels. This thesis has focused on establishing how the human rights 
framework can be a useful tool in this task. 
  
Extreme poverty deprives people of their basic needs and places them in a situation of 
vulnerability where they have no rights. It is undeniable that the efforts made by states to 
comply with many human rights, such as the right to adequate standards of living, to education 
and to health, constitute a progressive step in both recognition of human rights and in the 
fighting of extreme poverty. In that sense, human rights are an integral component of the 
poverty reduction strategies and the human rights framework provide tools for the poverty 
eradication agenda in different ways. 
 
It was argued that although many human rights are important to consider when addressing and 
formulating policies to tackle poverty, only a few of them have constitutive relevance to 
extreme poverty. Using the capability approach to define poverty, this thesis has established 
the human rights which have a constitutive relevance to poverty. These are: the right to life, 
the right to adequate standard of living, including housing, food and water, the right to health 
and the right to education. All of these rights are prescribed in international instruments as 
economic and social rights, the only exception is the right to life, which is presented in the civil 
and political set. It is through those rights that extreme poor people can resort to national, 
regional or international courts seeking remedies to their situation.  
 
The fulfilment of these recognized and binding human rights can be described as the basis of 
conditions in which it is possible to live without poverty. The main advantage of building 
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strategies to poverty mitigation through the human rights framework is the notion that states’ 
obligations can be raised.322 
 
Through the minimum core content, which establishes the obligations of states to ensure that a 
minimum essential level of each of the rights is satisfied in their jurisdiction, it is possible to 
establish extreme poverty as a human rights violation. In other words, once the deprivation of 
a minimum essential level of rights are usually concentrated among the most poor, through the 
minimum core approach it is possible to establish the state’s obligation to the most poor in a 
direct way. The obligation toward the fulfilment of a minimum core does not fall within the 
“progressive realizations” and has immediate effect. 
  
Features of the content of the right to life, to adequate standards of living, to health and 
education was explored in connection to poverty. Additionally, it was shown the applicability 
of human rights norms by national and international courts and how courts have considered 
poverty as an important factor when finding violations of human rights. It was concluded that 
although there are obstacles, especially regarding the access of the most poor to the judicial 
system, successful adjudications on the human rights field have brought remedies to the 
extremely poor. Adjudication can, therefore, be considered an important tool to empower the 
extremely poor.323 Adjudication gives visibility, voice, increases the accountability of duty 
bearers, protects and provides remedies for alleged violation, develops means of compensation, 
creates basis to policies and develops the poverty legal framework.324 
 
The implementation of human rights is a responsibility of national states and when a state 
ratifies regional and international human rights instruments they are required to ensure that the 
individuals in their jurisdiction can benefit from the guarantees prescribed by these 
instruments.325 International bodies have supervisory monitoring functions that contributes 
towards the implementation and evolution of international human rights law. International 
bodies clarify the content and obligations of states towards human rights and offers subsidiary 
protection through individual complaints mechanisms. Using jurisprudence from Africa and 
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Latin America it was possible to demonstrate that states have been held accountable for human 
rights’ violations of the extremely poor at international level. 
 
It is possible to observe from the international jurisprudence that in the African system there 
are important cases which recognized economic, social and cultural rights, including those that 
have a constitutive relevance to poverty. However, the African Commission has not yet 
established a clear connection between these violations and extreme poverty. Also, the relevant 
decisions on this system was only found in the African Commission, the quasi-judicial body of 
the system.  
 
On the other hand, the Inter-American Court, the judicial body of the Inter- American system, 
has been considering poverty as a cause and as a consequence of human rights’ violations, 
including in connection to other civil and political rights. Inter-American Court only recently 
started to recognize economic and social rights as enforceable per se, which represents a 
progress in the justiciability of economic and social rights. Nevertheless, economic and social 
rights have for long been considered as part of the evaluation of what would constitute the 
minimum requirement for survival and for living a life in dignity and therefore indispensable 
to determine a violation of the right to life.  
 
This thesis showed that extremely poor people are a vulnerable group which are 
disproportionally deprived of rights, including their minimum core. It presented the obligations 
of the states towards the extremely poor people and highlighted the importance of access to 
justice as a key tool to empower the poor. Altogether, it is possible to conclude that human 
rights can offer a direction for states to formulate their policies in tackling poverty. 
International protection systems have been clarifying the content and obligation of states 
towards the human rights which have a constitutive relevance to poverty and regional systems 
have also started to develop a poverty jurisprudence that can effectively bring remedies to the 
very poor. Tackling poverty is a pressing human issue and can no longer be ignored. The world 
has reached a stage of development in which extreme poverty can no longer be considered 
beyond the reach of most of the countries. Policies focused on poverty reduction have not been 
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adopted because states have failed to accept their obligations following from their recognition 
of the human rights framework.326 
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